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Companies play a very important role in the economy of any country. A 
country’s economic growth and development depend largely on whether 
or not its regulatory environment is conducive for enterprises to thrive. 
In recognition of the important role companies and businesses generally 
play in an economy, several developing countries have, in recent years, 
been carrying out reforms intended to enhance the ease of doing 
business in their respective countries. Zambia has been no exception. 
Some of the issues that are widely accepted as having an influence on 
the ease of doing business include the cost and length of dispute 
resolution for businesses. Therefore, it is unsurprising that some 
reforms aimed at, among other things, expediting and lowering the cost 
of commercial dispute resolution have taken place in Zambia. For 
example, the commercial list of the High Court was established in 1999 
with a view to expediting the resolution of commercial disputes. 
However, the cost of commercial dispute resolution remains of concern. 
The dissertation explores the Zambian Companies Act dispute resolution 
framework in a bid to consider its standing vis-à-vis enhancing Zambia’s 
competitiveness in so far as the ease of doing business is concerned. It 
posits that the Companies Act resolution framework does not help 
Zambia’s quest to enhance the ease of doing business on the dispute 
resolution front because it is predominantly anchored on recourse to 
court. A comparative study of current trends in company law dispute 
resolution is undertaken, which reveals a shift from reliance on the 
courts as the predominant dispute resolution forum to tribunal based 
dispute resolution. The dissertation ultimately recommends the 
establishment of a Companies Tribunal for Zambia as a measure that 
would contribute to lowering the cost of commercial dispute resolution – 
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at least in the context of the Companies Act – and enhancing the ease of 
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This chapter is introductory in nature. It serves as the 
springboard for subsequent analyses and discussions. As the 
dissertation revolves around the question of establishing a Companies 
Tribunal in Zambia, it is necessary – from the outset – to give an 
overview of tribunals from a common law perspective.1 Therefore, this 
chapter opens with a brief discussion of the term ‘tribunal’ and a 
highlight of the relevance of tribunals in a justice system. Thereafter, the 
raison d’etre for the dissertation is provided, followed by a statement of 
the research question. As the dissertation includes a comparative study 
of some jurisdictions that have established or provided for tribunals or 
similar frameworks for certain company law matters, justification for the 
choice of the jurisdictions to be compared is provided after the 
statement of the research question. Thereafter, the literature review is 
given; followed by a brief comment on the research methodology 
employed for the dissertation. The chapter concludes with a synopsis of 
subsequent chapters. 
 
2. An overview of tribunals in common law jurisdictions 
The term ‘tribunal’ appears not to have a universally agreed 
definition. Ascribing an exact meaning to it is said to be a difficult 
undertaking but context or jurisdiction informs its meaning.2 In its 
                                                          
1 The choice of the common law perspective of tribunals is informed by the fact that 
Zambia is a common law jurisdiction.  
2 Lord Justice Carnwath & Murray Chitra et al ‘An Overview of the Tribunal Scenes in 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom’ in Robin Creycke (ed) 
Tribunals in the Common Law World (2008) 2. 
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ordinary usage, for example, the term ‘tribunal’ includes ‘a court of 
justice … [and] a seat for a judge or judges’3. However, in the context of 
this dissertation, a tribunal does not include a court or the seat for a 
judge. This being the case, a consideration of the meaning of ‘tribunal’ 
for purposes of this dissertation is well founded. 
A tribunal is a body ‘with judicial or quasi-judicial functions set 
up by statute and existing outside the usual judicial hierarchy of the 
[courts]’4. While this definition has been criticised as not being 
comprehensive on account that ‘… in current legal parlance “tribunal” 
has been described as a “basket word” embracing many different 
institutions’5, it largely suffices for purposes of this dissertation as will 
become evident in due course.  
It is noteworthy that, in terms of the nature of matters they deal 
with, tribunals are generally concerned with resolving claims against the 
State.6 However, it is not uncommon for them to handle disputes 
between private persons – both natural and juristic.7 The cases dealt 
with by tribunals range from simple to complex matters such as tax 
issues.8 
That tribunals are an integral part of the justice systems of many 
countries is undeniable. The establishment of a unified tribunal system 
in the United Kingdom;9 the existence of the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal in Australia;10 the creation of the National Consumer Tribunal 
                                                          
3 Catherine Soanes & Angus Stevenson (eds) Concise Oxford English Dictionary 11 ed 
(2008) 1539. 
4 Mick Woodley (ed) Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary 10 ed (2005) 406.  
5 J R S Forbes Justice in Tribunals (2002) 1. 
6 LJ Carnwath & M Chitra et al op cit note 2 at 20. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid at 21. 
9 The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, provides for a unified tribunal 
system in the United Kingdom. The Act is available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/15/pdfs/ukpga_20070015_en.pdf 
accessed on 22 February 2015. 
10 The Administrative Appeals Tribunal was established by s 5 of the Administrative 
Appeals Act 91 of 1975, available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013C00449 accessed on 22 February 2015. 
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and the Companies Tribunal in South Africa;11 and the recent 
institution of the Competition and Consumer Protection Tribunal in 
Zambia12 all suggest that tribunals play a pivotal role in a justice 
system.  
Tribunals provide a welcome alternative to the often expensive, 
tedious, complex, rigid and lengthy litigation in the courts for a number 
of reasons. First, tribunals are seen as a flexible dispute resolution 
mechanism which allows for the development and adaptation of 
‘procedures to suit the characteristics of the jurisdiction, and the needs 
of its users, be they unrepresented individuals or sophisticated city 
institutions’13. Secondly, there is an assertion that public interest is 
served by allowing ‘questions arising under public Acts or consensual 
rules to be resolved as privately and expeditiously as possible’14. Lastly, 
Lord Wilberforce, in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission,15 
characterised tribunals as being ‘set up to deal with matters of a 
specialised character, in the interest of economy, speed, and expertise’16. 
Indeed tribunals are credited for being ‘cheaper, more accessible and 
informal, speedier and [affording relevant expertise] …’17   
 
3. Rationale for the topic 
The Zambian Government has been undertaking reforms aimed at 
easing the doing of business in the country. These reforms appear to 
have been stimulated by a recognition that the private sector in general 
                                                          
11 The National Consumer Tribunal is a creation of s 26 of the National Credit Act 34 of 
2005; the Companies Tribunal was established by s 193 of the Companies Act 71 of 
2008. 
12 The Competition and Consumer Protection Tribunal is a creature of s 67 of the 
Competition and Consumer Protection Act 24 of 2010 available at 
http://www.parliament.gov.zm/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=13
5&dir=DESC&order=date&limit=5&limitstart=20 accessed on 22 February 2015. 
13 LJ Carnwath et al op cit note 2 at 21. 
14 J Forbes op cit note 5 at 2. 
15 (1969) 2 A.C. 147 
16 Ibid at 207. 
17 LJ Carnwath et al op cit note 2 at 19.   
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and companies in particular are engines of economic growth18 in a 
liberalised economy like that of Zambia. A number of laws have, in the 
reform process, been repealed, amended or enacted in order to ensure a 
thriving private sector and attendant economic growth. Among the laws 
that have been amended in the course of this reform process is the 
Companies Act Cap 38819 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Companies Act’) 
in order to, inter alia, make incorporation of a company cheaper and 
easier20 as well as to enhance the Registrar’s enforcement powers21. 
While the reforms undertaken thus far are commendable, they 
appear to have focused more on relaxing regulatory requirements in 
order to, inter alia, reduce the cost of doing business in Zambia and less 
on the equally important matter – in so far as the cost of doing business 
is concerned – of dispute resolution in business generally, and in the 
context of company law particularly.  
It is generally agreed that a speedy, cheap, efficient, flexible, 
simple and effective dispute resolution framework for businesses tends 
to promote their growth and consequently the economic growth of a 
                                                          
18 The preamble of the Private Sector Development Reform Programme II at 3 
acknowledges this point. The document is available at 
http://psdzambia.org/uploads/3/0/7/4/3074051/psdrp_ii_programme_document.pdf 
accessed on 27 August 2014. 
19 Available at http://www.zamlii.org/zm/legislation/consolidated-act/388 accessed on 
24 November 2014. 
20 For example, the Companies (Amendment) Act 12 of 2010, repealed the Companies 
Act provisions that required public limited companies and private companies limited 
by shares to comply with minimum capital requirements before commencing business 
operations. The repealed s 15 of the Companies Act prohibited a public limited 
company from commencing business operations without the registrar of companies’ 
certificate confirming that the nominal value of the allotted shares of the company is 
not less than a prescribed minimum capital. In terms of the repealed s 18 of the 
Companies Act, a private company limited by shares could only commence business 
operations once consideration, to a prescribed value, was paid to the company for the 
issue of its shares. Act 12 of 2010 has effectively made it cheaper to incorporate a 
company in that a company is no longer required to meet a statutory minimum capital 
threshold prior to commencement of business operations. The said Act is available at 
http://www.zambialii.org/files/zm/legislation/act/2010/12/Companies%20%28Amen
dment%29%20Act.PDF accessed on 22 February 2015. 
21 According to s 109A of the Companies Act introduced by the Companies 
(Amendment) Act 24 of 2011, for instance, the registrar of companies is empowered to 
disqualify a non-compliant receiver from acting as such. The registrar did not have 
such powers prior to this amendment. 
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country. A number of countries have – apparently in a bid to create 
business-friendly environments and promote economic growth through 
speedy, simpler and cost-effective dispute resolution22 – established or 
provided for tribunals to hear and determine certain matters and 
disputes arising from their respective laws regulating companies.23 
However, the primary forum – arguably the only forum of first 
instance – for dispute resolution in terms of the Companies Act is the 
High Court of Zambia24. It is universally accepted that litigation tends to 
be costly, complex, and lengthy; this fact holds for Zambia as it holds for 
many other countries. Therefore, the need for cheaper, simpler and 
efficient mechanisms for settling certain disputes or matters that arise 
from the Companies Act – in the interest of further easing the doing of 
business and consequently promoting economic growth – cannot be 
overemphasised. 
 
4. The research question 
That specialised tribunals are seen as ideal for the determination 
of certain company law matters is evident from their establishment in 
some countries as pointed out earlier. This dissertation postulates that 
establishment of a specialised tribunal for the determination of certain 
                                                          
22 For instance, one of the compelling reasons for the establishment of the Companies 
Tribunal in South Africa was the need for expedition of the adjudicative process. See 
Department of Trade and Industry South African Company Law for the 21st Century: 
Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform General Notice 1183 of 2004 49 available at 
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/26493_gen1183a.pdf accessed on 11 
February 2015.  Even though this General Notice did not expressly state that the 
rationale behind the need for expedition of the adjudicative process was partly to 
ensure a more business-friendly environment and promote economic growth, the 
general theme of the corporate law reform process – revolving around rationalising 
South African company law in keeping with international trends and economic 
changes – implicitly encompassed these issues.  
23 Some of the countries that have established or provided for tribunals or special 
adjudicative bodies for certain disputes or enforcement matters in their respective 
companies laws are Australia, India, South Africa and the United Kingdom. 
24 For example, s 379 of the Companies Act provides that an appeal against a decision 
of the registrar of companies lies to the High Court. The issue of the current dispute 
resolution framework in Zambia is given more detailed consideration in chapter two. 
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matters and disputes arising from the Companies Act would answer to 
the need for reform – as demonstrated in the next chapter – in this area 
of law in Zambia. The question then is: what kind of tribunal is best 
suited for Zambian company law in the light of international best 
practices?  
In answering this question, the dissertation will discuss the 
current dispute resolution framework as provided for in the Companies 
Act. It will also be necessary to compare the relevant frameworks in 
some countries that have set up tribunals to deal with certain matters 
and disputes arising from their respective laws regulating companies in 
order to establish international best practices. The countries whose 
frameworks will be compared are Australia, India and South Africa.  
While the comparative study is expected to aid the making of a case for 
the establishment of a Zambian Companies Tribunal, caution will be 
urged against wholesome importation of a particular framework but a 
framework that best suits the Zambian circumstances will be argued 
for. 
 
5. Justification for the choice of jurisdictions discussed 
The reasons for the choice of the countries for the comparative 
study are varied but one that is common to all of them is the shared 
common law heritage or influence. Australia is ideal for the comparison 
because the Administrative Appeals Tribunal25, which hears and 
determines certain matters arising from the Corporations Act 50 of 
200126 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Corporations Act’), has been in 
existence for well over three decades and is likely to offer insightful 
lessons from its many years of existence. 
                                                          
25 Established by s 5 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975. 




It is necessary to consider the South African model because it is 
the only African country, in so far as the author could ascertain, that 
has a Companies Tribunal and therefore the only one available for 
consideration or discussion in Africa. 
A study of the Indian model is necessary because it provides for 
the most extensive, jurisdictionally, company law tribunal and would 
thus offer valuable insights regarding the framework that Zambia could 
adopt. 
 
6. Literature review 
A review of literature on the subject revealed that not much has 
been written on it. In fact, in so far as dispute resolution in terms of the 
Companies Act is concerned, the author did not find any scholarly 
writings. The dissertation is arguably the first scholarly work on the 
subject with regard to Zambian company law.  
The literature review also established that, while tribunals have 
generally been the subject of scholarly writing27, not much has been 
written specifically in relation to them in the context of dispute 
resolution in company law. For example, in the case of Australia, there 
are scholarly writings on the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in 
general28 but not much, if anything has been written on it in the context 
of the Corporations Act.  
The findings stated in the immediately preceding two paragraphs 
notwithstanding, some scholars have touched on the subject of 
company law tribunals in respect of India and South Africa. In the case 
of India, Datar Arvind29 discusses the National Company Law Tribunal 
                                                          
27 Some of the books that have addressed the subject of tribunals include: LJ 
Carnwath & M Chitra et al op cit note 2; J Forbes op cit note 5; and Chantal Stebbings 
Legal Foundations of tribunals in Nineteenth-Century England (2006). 
28 Peter Cane Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (2009) 




for India and undertakes a brief comparative analysis of administrative 
justice tribunals in selected jurisdictions, namely the United States of 
America, Jamaica, Canada and Australia.30  However, Arvind’s 
comparative analysis, in addition to being brief, does not involve 
companies tribunals or their equivalent in the named jurisdictions. This 
dissertation undertakes a comparative study – albeit not involving all 
the jurisdictions compared by Arvind – in the context of company law 
tribunals as opposed to administrative justice tribunals generally. 
In the case of the South African Companies Tribunal, much of the 
commentary has been on the welcome broadening of options for 
adjudication and dispute resolution in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
(hereafter referred to as ‘the Companies Act 2008’) as well as a 
restatement of the functions of the tribunal.31 Detailed scholarly 
analyses of the Companies Tribunal’s mandate and its performance so 
far appear to be non-existent or difficult to find. This dissertation 
focuses on these unexplored aspects of the Companies Tribunal. 
It is clear from the literature reviewed that the dissertation will not 
only provide sound proposals for the reform of the Zambian company 
law dispute resolution framework but also offer a hitherto not explored 
comparative perspective of international best practices in determining 
certain matters and disputes arising from laws regulating companies. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/electronic_journals/ju_jur/ju_jur_2006_a1
3.pdf accessed on 28 March 2014. 
30 Ibid at 297 – 301. 
31 See Farouk HI Cassim ‘Introduction to the New Companies Act: General Overview of 
the Act’ and Maleka Femida Cassim ‘Enforcement and Regulatory Agencies’ in Farouk 
HI Cassim (ed) Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 25, 837 – 40 and 852 – 3 
respectively; and Dorothy Farisani ‘The potency of co-ordination of enforcement 
functions by the new and revamped regulatory authorities under the new Companies 
Act’ 2010 Acta Juridica: Modern company law for a competitive South African economy 
433 – 45 available at 
http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/electronic_journals/ju_jur/ju_jur_2010_a2




The research will mainly be desk-based involving a review and 
analysis of relevant statutes, books, journal articles and websites. 
 
8. A synopsis of chapters 
Chapter two will discuss the dispute resolution framework 
provided for in the Companies Act. It will also highlight the nature of 
disputes that may arise in terms of the Companies Act through an 
examination of the registrar’s, and the High Court’s, powers. In addition, 
some of the challenges with the current dispute resolution mechanism 
will be discussed and it will be argued, inter alia, that the status quo 
does not aid the quest for further ease of doing business and attendant 
economic growth. The chapter will bring to the fore the need for reform 
in this area of company law. 
The third chapter will consider current trends in dispute 
resolution mechanisms employed in the area of company law in selected 
jurisdictions, namely Australia, India and South Africa. The intention 
will be to compare these jurisdictions’ tribunal systems in the context of 
company law with a view to identifying a model that would be best 
suited to Zambia. 
Chapter four, which is the last chapter, will argue for the 
establishment of a Companies Tribunal for Zambia, drawing on best 
practices highlighted in the previous chapter. The chapter will, in this 













The number of companies being incorporated in Zambia has been 
on the rise in recent years. For example, the number of companies 
incorporated in 2012 was 9 678 whereas 2013 saw 10 143 companies 
being incorporated.32 It is arguable that the simplified incorporation 
procedures introduced through the several amendments made to the 
Companies Act – some of which were highlighted in the previous 
chapter33 – are partly responsible for these welcome statistics.  
That the surge in companies being incorporated would likely see a 
rise in Companies Act disputes matters may not be a far-fetched 
assertion. Therefore, it is necessary to appreciate the nature and extent 
of possible Companies Act disputes or matters as well as the suitability 
of the current dispute resolution framework generally and in relation to 
Zambia’s competitiveness in its quest to further ease the doing of 
business in particular. This chapter answers to this need by giving a 
general overview of the Companies Act dispute resolution framework; 
and highlighting the possible Companies Act disputes in the context of 
decisions of the registrar of companies (hereafter referred to as ‘the 
registrar’), powers of the High Court and offences.  
This chapter posits that the Companies Act dispute resolution 
framework does not accord with the much touted ideals of speedy, cost-
effective and efficient dispute resolution models for businesses. It is also 
argued that the status quo is an impediment to Zambia’s quest to 
further ease the doing of business. In other words, the chapter reveals 
the need for reform in the area of resolution of Companies Act disputes. 
                                                          
32 Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA) ‘2013 Annual Report’ (2014) 6, 
available at file:///C:/Users/zambia/Downloads/Annual%20Report%202013.pdf 
accessed on 5 December 2014. 




2.0. Companies Act dispute resolution framework 
The High Court of Zambia (in this chapter referred to as ‘court’) is 
the major dispute resolution platform in the context of the Companies 
Act. This is so because the definition of court in section 2 of the 
Companies Act is ‘the High Court for Zambia’ unless the context in 
which the word is used requires otherwise; and there are several 
references to the word court in the Act. 
The civil registry of the court is divided into two lists – the general 
list and the commercial list. The commercial list, as the name suggests, 
is reserved for disputes of a commercial nature. While the High Court 
Rules made pursuant to the High Court Act, Cap 2734 are generally 
applicable to the commercial list, there are additional rules applicable 
only to the commercial list35 designed to ensure the speedy disposal of 
cases to suit the needs of commerce. 
Be this as it may, filing an action in the commercial list is more 
expensive than doing so in the general list. Therefore, while companies 
may prefer to file actions of a commercial nature in the commercial list 
on account of the possibility of speedier resolution thereof than in the 
general list, the costs associated with commercial list actions may be an 
impediment especially for small companies. In other words, one can 
validly argue that the commercial list of the High Court does not 
enhance the ease of doing business in that it makes dispute resolution 
expensive whereas lowering the cost of dispute resolution is one of the 
factors that enhance the ease of doing business.36 
                                                          
34 Available at http://www.zamlii.org/zm/legislation/consolidated-act/27 accessed on 
22 February 2015. 
35 High Court (Amendment) Rules statutory instrument No. 29 of 1999 introduced 
Order 53, which contains provisions governing the filing and prosecution of causes 
arising from transactions ‘relating to commerce, trade, industry or any action of a 
business nature’. See O 53(1) of the said rules. 
36 The cost of litigation contributed to the World Bank’s ranking Zambia at 98 out of 
189 economies on the ease of enforcing contracts for 2015. See World Bank Doing 
Business 2015: Going beyond Efficiency (2014) 68 available at 
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That the court is the major dispute resolution forum for 
Companies Act disputes entails that alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as arbitration37 and mediation38 are, to the extent 
that their trigger is a court action, relegated to the periphery. These two 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and their place in the 
resolution of Companies Act disputes are discussed under this heading. 
Arbitration clauses are quite common in commercial agreements 
partly because of the private nature of arbitration and the relative speed 
at which disputes are generally resolved as compared to the public and 
lengthy nature of the litigation process. The resolution of disputes 
through arbitration in Zambia is primarily governed by the Arbitration 
Act 19 of 2000.39 Other Acts may provide for the resolution of disputes, 
in the context of such Acts, through arbitration; and section 5(1) of the 
Arbitration Act provides that the Act ordinarily applies to arbitration 
conducted in terms of such other Acts.  
However, where the provisions of another Act regarding arbitration 
under that Act are at variance or inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Arbitration Act, the provisions of the other Act prevail.40  
Section 322(4) of the Companies Act, which requires the 
submission of disputes to do with the price at which dissenting 
members’ shares should be sold by a liquidator in certain instances, is 
an example of a statutory provision in an Act other than the Arbitration 
                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/giawb/doing%20business/documents/profile
s/country/ZMB.pdf accessed on 22 February 2015. While this ranking relates to 
enforcement of contracts, it is indicative of the general impact of the cost of litigation 
on the ease of doing business. 
37 Arbitration can generally be defined as ‘[a] method of dispute resolution involving 
one or more neutral third parties who are usually agreed to by the disputing parties 
and whose decision is binding’. See Bryan A Garner (ed) Black’s Law Dictionary 9 ed 
(2009) 119. 
38 In general terms, mediation is ‘[a] method of nonbinding dispute resolution involving 
a neutral third party who tries to help the disputing parties reach a mutually agreeable 
solution’. Ibid 1070 – 1. 
39 Available at 
http://www.zambialii.org/files/zm/legislation/act/2000/19/aa2000137.pdf accessed 
on 22 February 2015. 
40 Arbitration Act s 5(3). 
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Act that requires the determination of a dispute through arbitration. To 
the extent that section 322(7)(c) of the Companies Act empowers the 
court to give binding directions to the parties regarding the 
commencement and conduct of the arbitration, the section excludes the 
application of the Arbitration Act to the arbitration unless the court 
gives a direction that the arbitration be conducted in accordance with 
the Arbitration Act. 
Order 45 of the High Court Rules made pursuant to the High 
Court Act is another example of a statutory provision in an Act other 
than the Arbitration Act that provides for arbitration of disputes. Order 
45 empowers the court to refer a matter to arbitration on the application 
of the parties thereto. Therefore, notwithstanding that the Companies 
Act only expressly provides for arbitration in terms of section 322, any 
other civil matter brought before the court in terms of the Companies 
Act is capable of determination through arbitration pursuant to Order 
45. 
Mediation in Zambia is provided for in Order 31 of the High Court 
Rules. Unlike arbitration, there is no stand-alone piece of legislation 
that provides for this process of dispute resolution. Therefore, mediation 
of a formal nature in Zambia is court-annexed. According to Order 31(4), 
a judge may refer a matter set down for trial to mediation. It should be 
noted that court actions involving constitutional issues, individual 
liberties, injunctive relief or matters deemed by a judge not to be 
suitable for such reference cannot be referred to mediation.41 Therefore, 
Companies Act civil disputes brought to court may be referred to 
mediation as long as they do not fall into the stated excluded categories.  
It is noteworthy that, whereas the court’s reference to arbitration 
may only be made on the application of the parties to an action, a judge 
may refer a matter to arbitration on the judge’s own motion; and to this 
                                                          
41 High Court Rules O 31(4). 
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extent it can be said that, at the point of making the reference, 
arbitration is party-driven while mediation is court-driven. In addition, 
while Order 45(3) leaves it to the court’s discretion to determine the 
period within which the arbitration should be completed, Order 31(7) 
prescribes a 60-day period for the completion of mediation from the date 
a mediator collects the relevant file from the mediation office. To the 
extent that the period for completion of mediation is fixed, mediation is 
more predictable than court-ordered arbitration. 
In any case court-ordered arbitration rarely, if ever, takes place in 
practice. This is probably because it is supposed to be triggered by the 
parties to an action and not the court. The most common instances of 
court-ordered arbitration are where the parties had a prior arbitration 
agreement and one of them raises a preliminary objection to the dispute 
in question being resolved by the court. 
It is important to note further, that court-ordered arbitration has 
the advantage that an application for a reference may be made to the 
court (a Deputy Registrar of the court may make such an order) or judge 
at any time after the filing of the action while court-annexed mediation 
is only available on the order of a judge (a Deputy Registrar of the court 
cannot make such an order) after the matter has been settled for trial. 
That settlement of pleadings takes long in many cases, casts doubt on 
the efficacy of court-annexed mediation in Zambia generally – let alone 
in respect of Companies Act disputes. In any case, where a matter 
referred to mediation is not resolved during that process, the matter 
goes to trial and precious time is lost along the way. 
It is clear from the foregoing discourse, and was pointed out in 
chapter one,42 that Companies Act disputes must almost always be 
brought to court for resolution if the parties thereto feel strongly about 
them. Recourse to mediation and arbitration in the first instance is 
                                                          
42 Supra 5 (note 24). 
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unlikely under the current dispute resolution framework. The question 
then is whether reform of the current dispute resolution framework is 
necessary. This question can best be answered by considering, as the 
next section does, the nature and magnitude of disputes provided for in 
the Companies Act.  
 
3.0. Companies Act disputes 
The Companies Act provides for both civil and criminal disputes. 
In the case of civil disputes, some may generally arise from decisions 
made by the registrar in the performance of the registrar’s functions 
while others can be gleaned from the powers accorded to the court. 
Other civil disputes may arise between members of the company inter se 
or between members of the company and the company. Consideration of 
these other civil disputes is beyond the scope of this paper. Criminal 
disputes are basically offences created by the Companies Act. This 
section considers decisions of the registrar, powers of court and offences 
in a bid to determine whether or not reform in respect of the Companies 
Act dispute resolution framework is necessary. 
 
3.1. Decisions of the registrar 
According to section 379 of the Companies Act, a person aggrieved 
by the decision of the registrar in the exercise or purported exercise of 
the registrar’s powers in terms of the Act may generally appeal against 
such a decision to the court. It is necessary to highlight the decisions 
that are appealable in terms of this section for two principal reasons. 
First, such an exercise offers a concise summary of appealable decisions 
of the registrar in terms of the Act. It follows that the decisions 
highlighted under this heading are appealable. Secondly, the 
undertaking is useful for purposes of the comparative study in the next 
chapter as well as for informing the conclusions and recommendations 




3.1.1. Decisions relating to incorporation and 
conversion 
Section 9(2) provides that the registrar may accept a statutory 
declaration filed with an application for incorporation in terms of that 
section as prima facie evidence of compliance with statutory 
requirements in respect of incorporation of a company. 
It is doubtful, however, from a practical perspective that anybody 
would challenge the registrar’s refusal to accept the statutory 
declaration as prima facie evidence of compliance because such an 
undertaking would most likely be an academic exercise as it is difficult 
to see what valuable right one would be seeking to protect in evidence 
that is not conclusive as to compliance. 
Section 16 limits the maximum number of members a private 
company may have to 50 persons. In addition, it provides that offering of 
securities to the public must be done in accordance with section 122 of 
the Act. If the registrar determines that a private company has breached 
the threshold for membership or has offered securities to the public in 
contravention of the said section 122, the registrar may issue a notice to 
the company requiring the latter to give reasons the company should 
not be converted to a public company.43 
In addition, section 16(6) empowers the registrar to apply to court 
for an order deeming the company to have been converted to a public 
company if the company does not rectify the contravention indicated in 
the registrar’s notice within one month of its having been issued.  
The Act does not state whether or not the company concerned 
must be a party to an application in terms of this section. However, it is 
inevitable that the company should be a party to such an application 
because the company has a right to respond to and be heard on the 
                                                          
43 Companies Act s 16(5). 
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application. Therefore, while it is arguably open to the company to 
challenge the registrar’s decision to issue a notice in terms of this 
section at any time before the registrar applies to court for an 
appropriate order, it is unlikely that the court would be moved at the 
instance of the company. 
According to section 41(1) as amended by section 5 of the 
Companies (Amendment) Act 24 of 2011 (in this chapter referred to as 
‘Act 24 of 2011’), the registrar may refuse to register a proposed 
company name if the name is likely to cause confusion with a well-
known name or the name of an existing company; if the registration is 
intended to prevent a person legitimately entitled to use the name from 
using it; or if registering the name is otherwise undesirable or not in the 
public interest. The registrar may also refuse to reserve a proposed 
company name if the name is not acceptable to the registrar and does 
not meet the criteria set out in section 38(2). 
The registrar may refuse a company limited by guarantee 
permission to dispense with the requirement to include the word 
‘limited’ in its name44 or indeed revoke permission granted to a company 
limited by guarantee to dispense with the inclusion of the word ‘limited’ 
in its name45. Where the registrar grants permission pursuant to an 
application made in terms of section 38(1), the registrar may impose 
conditions to the permission.46 
Section 40(3) empowers the registrar to either accept a proposed 
change of name by a company or reject it if the registrar is of the view 
that it is likely to cause confusion with another company’s name or is 
otherwise undesirable.  
                                                          
44 The registrar’s power of refusal is necessarily implied in the express power to grant 
written permission to dispense with the inclusion of the word ‘limited’ in the name of a 
company limited by guarantee that applies for such permission in terms of section 
39(1). 
45 Companies Act s 39(3). 
46 Ibid s 39(2). 
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The registrar undoubtedly enjoys wide discretionary powers in 
relation to the registration of, or refusal to register, company names. 
While the Act provides that a person aggrieved by any decision of the 
registrar may appeal to the court, this route is not suitable for disposing 
of disputes related to company names or proposed company names for a 
number of reasons. First, litigation is usually lengthy and costly. For 
instance, it took close to two years to dispose of an interlocutory 
application in the nature of a summons for an interim injunction in the 
case of Airtel Holdings Limited and Others v Patents and Companies 
Registration Agency and Others47. The plaintiffs in this case sought to 
prevent the registration of a company name they contended was 
confusingly similar to theirs. 
Secondly, while an appeal against the registrar’s decision 
regarding a proposed company name is pending, the company risks 
losing out in terms of building goodwill on account of the company’s use 
of its incorporation number instead of a proper name.48 
Lastly, it is unlikely that a proposer of a company name that is 
rejected for registration by the registrar will take the matter to court 
even when they have a strong conviction against such rejection. The 
more likely course of action would be to submit another name for 
approval and registration. 
 
3.1.2. Decisions relating to receivers and liquidators 
The registrar is the accrediting authority for receivers and 
liquidators.49 In addition, section 109A(9)(b) as amended by section 8 of 
Act 24 of 2011 empowers the registrar to disqualify a receiver from 
                                                          
47 2010/HP/1216 available at http://www.zambialii.org/zm/judgment/high-
court/2012/45 accessed on 8 January 2015. 
48 The registrar is empowered, by s 41(3) as amended by Act 24 of 2011, to register a 
company whose proposed name is not accepted for registration by its registration 
number.  




acting as such.50 Further, the power of the registrar to remove an erring 
receiver from the register of receivers is implied in section 111(4)(b) as 
amended by section 9 of Act 24 of 2011. The said section requires the 
registrar to notify a professional body to which a receiver belongs, of the 
removal of such receiver from the register of receivers. It is noteworthy 
also that the registrar is expressly empowered to remove a receiver, to 
whom any of the disqualifications listed in section 111(3) as amended by 
section 9 of Act 24 of 2011 applies, from the register of receivers.51 
The registrar may also disqualify a liquidator from acting as such 
by removing such liquidator’s name from the register of liquidators if the 
liquidator does not comply with a notice to submit a report required of 
the liquidator by section 288(1) as amended by section 26 of Act 24 of 
2011.52 It is noteworthy that, on removal of a liquidator’s name from the 
register of liquidators, the registrar must notify the professional body to 
which the liquidator belongs of such removal.53 
Further, section 117(1) as amended by section 12 of Act 24 of 
2011 empowers the registrar to extend the time for lodging of a 
receiver’s accounts from time to time during the receivership as well as 
after ceasing to be a receiver. It follows, for example, that where a 
receiver requests for an extension of time for lodging accounts and the 
registrar rejects the request, the receiver may appeal to the court 
against the refusal. 
Most of the decisions the registrar may make under this 
subheading border on the integrity of not only receivers and liquidators 
                                                          
50 It should be noted that the reference, in s 109A(9), to non-compliance with subsec 
(1) thereof as the basis upon which a receiver may be disqualified from acting as such 
is erroneous because the said subsec (1) does not impose an obligation on the receiver 
to submit any report to the registrar as stated in s 109A(9). It would appear that there 
was an oversight on the part of the legislators in this regard as subsec (7)(b) is the one 
that obliges a receiver to lodge copies of the relevant statements with the registrar and 
not subsec (1). 
51 Companies Act s 118A(1)(d) as amended by Act 24 of 2011 s 13. 
52 Companies Act s 288(3)(b) as amended by Act 24 of 2011 s 26. 
53 Companies Act s 332(4)(b) as amended by Act 24 of 2011 s 27. 
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but also the receivership and liquidation processes. Recourse to court 
against such decisions may thus be justified. However, it is arguable 
that the long time it usually takes to conclude court cases militates 
against its justification. 
  
3.1.3. Decisions relating to the offer of securities to the 
public 
According to section 123(2)(c), an invitation to the public to 
purchase shares or debentures in a company intended to be published 
in a newspaper or magazine summarising the contents of a prospectus 
must be approved in writing by the registrar. In addition, the registrar is 
obliged to decline to register a non-compliant prospectus in terms of 
section 126. 
Where a prospectus is registered but the registrar later determines 
that the prospectus contains a misleading statement, omits or conceals 
a material fact or does not comply with any relevant statutory 
requirement, the registrar may apply to court for any of the following 
orders, namely cancellation of the registration of the prospectus; 
declaration of contracts of purchase of any securities voidable; an order 
to the issuers of the prospectus to re-issue an amended prospectus; or 
an order protecting the rights of persons adversely affected by the issue 
of the prospectus.54 
Section 260(2) stipulates that the provisions relating to invitation 
of the public to subscribe for securities in a company apply, with 
necessary changes, to foreign companies. However, the registrar may 
waive or modify these provisions in relation to a foreign company if the 
foreign company makes an application to that effect.55 
Offers of securities to the public are by their nature time-sensitive 
and appealing against the registrar’s decisions in respect thereof may 
                                                          
54 Companies Act s 131(1) and (2). 
55 Ibid s 260(3). 
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not be ideal. However, looked at from the need to protect the investing 
public from incurring losses on account of lapses in the relevant 
processes, it is perhaps justifiable that anybody aggrieved with the 
registrar’s decision should go to court so that the court has an 
opportunity to ensure that the offer to the public is above board. 
 
3.1.4. Accounts, audit and annual returns 
Section 165(1) generally requires a holding company to prepare 
group accounts covering its group of companies at the end of a financial 
year. However, a subsidiary’s accounts may be omitted from the group 
accounts where each director of the holding company files a statutory 
declaration with the registrar to the effect that inclusion of a 
subsidiary’s accounts may be, among other possible reasons, 
impracticable, expensive, or harmful to the company or any of its 
subsidiaries.56 The registrar’s written approval of such an omission is 
necessary.57 
The registrar may, in terms of section 171(9) and (10), appoint and 
fix the remuneration of an auditor for a company that goes three months 
without one. 
Section 184(1) requires companies to file annual returns within 
specified periods of time after the end of each financial year. The 
registrar may publish in the Gazette or any newspaper, a list of 
companies whose annual returns are overdue and is not liable for such 
publication if done in good faith.58 This means that the registrar is liable 
for bad faith publication of a list of companies whose annual returns are 
overdue. 
The registrar may, according to section 188A(3) as amended by 
section 14 of Act 24 of 2011, cause the inspection of a company’s 
                                                          
56 Ibid s 165(3). 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid s 184(4) and (5). 
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records the registrar considers necessary for the better carrying out of 
the provisions of the Act notwithstanding the filing by such company of 
a no-change return. 
According to section 189A as amended by section 16 of Act 24 of 
2011, the registrar may strike out the name of a company from the 
register of companies or disqualify an officer of a company from forming, 
or becoming a director of, a company for a period of five years where the 
company or officer does not comply with the provisions of the Act 
relating to the filing of annual returns. 
 
3.1.5. Foreign companies 
Section 249(2) requires a foreign company to state the names of 
its local directors on trade circulars and business correspondence 
containing its name. However, the registrar may by notice in the Gazette 
exempt the foreign company from this requirement if special 
circumstances exist that justify it.59 
According to section 251(1) a foreign company must file annual 
accounts and auditor’s report in respect of the operations and assets in 
Zambia within three months after the end of its financial year. However, 
on the application or with the consent of the local directors of a foreign 
company, the registrar may modify any of the requirements of the Act in 
respect of the annual accounts and auditor’s report as long as doing so 
does not cause the accounts and reports to give a false view of the profit 
or loss on the company’s operations, or the company’s state of affairs, in 
Zambia.60 
Further, the registrar may in terms of section 252(8) exempt a 
foreign company, generally or in a particular financial year, from any of 
the requirements in relation to the keeping of accounting records if the 
special circumstances of the company justify such exemption. 
                                                          
59 Ibid s 249(3). 
60 Ibid s 251(6). 
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A foreign company’s name must, in terms of section 253(1), 
generally be the same as its name in the country of its incorporation or 
a translation or transliteration thereof depending on whether the name 
is in English or another language that uses or does not use Roman 
characters. However, a foreign company may apply to the registrar to be 
allowed to have a different name in Zambia.61 In other words, the 
registrar may permit a foreign company to have a name that is different 
from the company’s name in the country of its incorporation. Where the 
name of a foreign company is likely to ‘cause confusion with the name of 
another body corporate or is otherwise undesirable’62, the registrar may 
order the company to adopt another name for use in Zambia.63  
According to section 253(4), the registrar cannot register a body 
corporate applying for registration as a foreign company if the registrar 
has ordered that it changes its name. It is interesting to note that 
whereas a rejection of a proposed company name for a local company is 
not a bar to the incorporation of the company by its designating number 
in the event of non-compliance with a directive to change the name,64 a 
foreign company ordered to adopt a different name can only be 
registered once it complies with the order.65  
Section 253(5) provides that where the order for adoption of a 
different name is made in respect of an already registered foreign 
company and the company does not comply with the order within 42 
days of being ordered to do so, the registrar must register the 
designating number of the company together with the words ‘Foreign 
Company’66 as the name of the company. 
                                                          
61 Ibid s 253(2). 
62 Ibid s 253(3). 
63 Ibid. 
64 Supra 18 (note 48). 
65 There is no justification for this differential treatment between foreign companies 
and local companies. It is hoped that the ongoing Companies Act review process will 
ensure harmonious treatment of foreign and local companies on this issue. 




3.1.6. Other decisions 
 Section 138(2) provides that the registrar may, on the application 
of any member of a company, convene or direct the convening of an 
annual general meeting of the company if none is held within three 
months after the end of the company’s financial year. The registrar may 
also give further directions in relation to the convening and holding of 
an annual general meeting. 
Section 361 empowers the registrar to strike out the name of a 
defunct company from the register of companies. In addition, the 
registrar may in terms of section 361(1) as amended by section 30 of Act 
24 of 2011 – not less than five years after it was struck out – re-issue 
the name of a company struck out from the register of companies to an 
applicant therefor. 
The registrar may refuse to register a document lodged with the 
registrar in compliance with the requirements of the Act on any of the 
grounds set out in section 370(5). In addition, section 370(7) provides 
that the registrar may direct that information contained in a document 
lodged with the registrar be verified by a statutory declaration. 
In theory, a company aggrieved by the registrar’s refusal to 
register its documents or an order to verify information contained in a 
document lodged with the registrar can appeal to the court against such 
a decision. It is unlikely though, from a practical viewpoint, that a 
company would take this route considering the cost and time 
implications of litigation in comparison to the less costly option of doing 
the registrar’s bidding even if the company does not agree with the 
reasons for refusal or the basis for demanding a statutory declaration.  
Further, section 371(2) clothes the registrar with power to extend 
the time for filing of a document on the application of a company made 




Section 372A(1) as amended by section 31 of Act 24 of 2011 
authorises the registrar to issue notices in respect of issues for which 
notices are required under the Act. 
Lastly, the registrar may order an officer or employee of a 
company, a company, companies or a class of companies to furnish 
certain information or statistics to the registrar in respect of the 
company’s or companies’ operations during specified periods.67 
It is doubtful that anybody would consider seeking redress in 
court in respect of most of the decisions highlighted under this 
subheading. Indeed the wisdom in making some of these decisions 
appealable to court is questionable given their administrative nature.  
 
3.1.7. General comments 
The blanket provision that decisions of the registrar are only 
appealable to court is certainly problematic especially considering the 
administrative nature of some of these decisions. There is no doubt that 
the registrar is a very powerful person in so far as administration of the 
Companies Act and regulation of companies are concerned.  
While it is necessary to clothe the registrar with the power to 
make the decisions highlighted under this heading, making recourse 
against all such decisions to court is hardly ideal. In many of the cases 
an aggrieved person will most likely not go to court because going to 
court is academic or does not make economic sense (the cost and time 
involved in court cases militate against this option). In reality, most of 
the decisions the registrar is empowered to make in terms of the 
Companies Act are final as they are unlikely to be challenged for the 
reasons just given. Therefore, it is necessary to relook at the issue of 
recourse against the registrar’s decisions to ensure a responsive and 
relevant dispute resolution framework. 
                                                          




3.2. Powers of court 
That there are several references to the word ‘court’ in the 
Companies Act has already been stated in this chapter. Suffice to say 
that the nature and magnitude of disputes or applications over which 
the court has jurisdiction (with the exception of the court’s jurisdiction 
in respect of appeals against the registrar’s decisions, which have 
already been considered) can largely be gleaned from the several 
references to the word ‘court’. This section highlights the powers 
possessed of the court in terms of the Act. 
 
3.2.1. Powers relating to incorporation and membership 
of companies 
According to section 16(5), the registrar may notify a private 
company of the need for the company to explain why it should not be 
converted to a public company on account of having more members 
than the maximum allowed by its articles of association or offering 
securities to the public in contravention of the relevant provisions of the 
Companies Act. In the event of the company so notified not making good 
the contravention within one month from the date of the notice, the 
court – on the registrar’s application – is empowered to order, inter alia, 
that the company be deemed to have been converted to a public 
company and that the costs of the application and conversion be borne 
by the company.68 
Section 6(1) as amended by section 3 of Act 24 of 2011 requires a 
company to have a minimum of two members. If the company carries on 
business for more than six months with less than two members, the 
member or a director of the company who allows this state of affairs is 
personally liable for the debts of the company incurred after the first six 
                                                          
68 Ibid s 16(6). 
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months of such non-compliance.69 It is necessarily implied from the 
wording of section 26(2) – particularly the reference to court – that the 
court has jurisdiction to hear and determine an action for the payment 
of a debt incurred by the company during the period referred to above. 
In terms of section 28(4), the court is empowered – on the 
application of a party to a pre-incorporation contract – to make any 
order regarding the liability of the company or any person who entered 
or purported to enter into the pre-incorporation contract on behalf of the 
company on such contract. 
Where a person sufficiently interested in a company or a member 
of the company notices a mistake in the register of members, the person 
or member may ask the company to correct the mistake. Section 50(1) 
provides that failures by the company to correct the mistake or loss 
occasioned by the mistake are actionable at the instance of the person 
or member of the company. Further, in terms of section 92(2), the 
provisions relating to correction of members’ registers apply – with 
necessary changes – to registers of debenture holders. In other words, 
the court is empowered to hear and determine an action brought in 
respect of a failure to rectify the register of members or debenture 
holders or loss occasioned by such failure. 
It appears that a section 50 or 92 action is available to an 
aggrieved person, member or debenture holder irrespective of the nature 
and effect of the mistake in the register. While it may be justifiable to 
take the matter to court where the alleged mistake in the register hinges 
on the question of a person’s being entitled to have their name entered 
in or removed from the register,70 it is doubtful whether the devotion of a 
court’s time and resources to hearing applications for the rectification of 
                                                          
69 Ibid s 26(1). 
70 Section 50(3) of the Companies Act empowers the court to decide questions 
regarding entitlement to be entered in or removed from the register. 
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register mistakes that do not affect the applicant’s rights or obligations 
in the company is justifiable. 
 
3.2.2. Powers relating to securities 
Section 62(4) provides that where a company’s articles of 
association do not expressly prohibit the variation of rights associated 
with a particular class of shares or if the articles specify the manner in 
which such rights may be varied, the rights may be varied by the written 
consent of holders of three-quarters of the issued shares of that class or 
through a special resolution of the holders of that class of shares passed 
at a separate general meeting of those holders. However, holders of an 
aggregate of at least 15 per cent of shares of the class whose rights have 
been varied by special resolution may apply to court for cancellation of 
the resolution within 21 days from the date of the resolution; and the 
court may confirm or cancel the resolution.71 
A reduction of a company’s share capital cannot, in terms of 
sections 76(1) and 77(1), take effect without the court’s confirmation. In 
addition, where the proposed share capital reduction would either 
require the payment of any paid up share capital to a shareholder or 
result in the decrease of liability for unpaid share capital, creditors 
whose claims or debts would entitle them to benefit from a distribution 
on a company’s winding up may object to the share capital reduction 
unless the court orders otherwise.72 If the court does not order 
otherwise, the court is obliged to compile a list of creditors entitled to 
object to a share capital reduction involving the decrease of liability on 
unpaid shares or payment of paid up share capital without the need for 
an application to that effect by any creditor.73 Section 77(3) stipulates 
that an order of the court disentitling creditors from objecting to a 
                                                          
71 Companies Act s 62(5). 
72 Ibid s 77(2) and (5). 
73 Ibid s 77(2) and (6). 
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proposed share capital reduction and absolving the court from the duty 
to compile a list of creditors entitled to object to the reduction may be in 
respect of a particular class or classes of creditors. 
The court is, by section 83(12), authorised to confirm or cancel a 
special resolution approving the provision of financial assistance by a 
company. An application for the cancellation of such a resolution must 
be made by no less than ‘… one fifth of members, being persons who did 
not consent to or vote in favour of the resolution…’74 
Section 88(4) provides that the court may, on application by a 
debenture holder, remove a trustee for debenture holders from office 
and replace them if the trustee’s interests conflict or are likely to conflict 
with those of the debenture holder or where it is not proper for the 
trustee to continue in office. 
Whereas an officer or auditor of a company is ordinarily 
disqualified from appointment as a trustee for debenture holders, 
section 89(1)(e) bestows on the court discretionary power to grant leave 
for the appointment of the officer or auditor as a trustee. Similarly, 
section 111(3)(h) as amended by section 9 of Act 24 of 2011 provides 
that a director or officer of a company or related body corporate, or a 
person who was a director or officer of the company or related body 
corporate within the preceding two years, may be appointed receiver 
with leave of the court. 
The court has power, in terms of section 94(2), to order the 
holding of a debenture holders’ meeting and to give directions regarding 
the manner in which the meeting should proceed. It is unclear whether 
the court in such a case moves on its own motion or at the instance of 
the company or debenture holder concerned. However, it is likely that 
the company or debenture holder has to move the court for such an 
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order because the relationship between the chargor and debenture 
holder is a contractual one not supervised by the court. 
According to section 108(1), the court is empowered to appoint a 
receiver or receiver and manager on the application of a debenture 
holder once a charge over a company’s property becomes enforceable. 
Crystallisation of a floating charge is an example of a charge over a 
company’s property becoming enforceable. 
Section 109A(1) as amended by section 8 of Act 24 of 2011 
requires directors of a company in respect of which a receiver has been 
appointed to prepare and avail the receiver, within three months of the 
receiver’s appointment, a statement of the company’s affairs as at the 
date of such appointment. However, the said section empowers the court 
to abridge or extend the period for the preparation and submission of 
the statement of affairs. In addition, subsection (4) authorises the court 
to give directions regarding notices to officers, former officers or 
incorporators of a company to make statutory declarations verifying 
matters capable of being verified by such persons. Further, in terms of 
subsection (6), the court may extend the period for the submission of 
such statutory declarations. 
It is also noteworthy that section 113(3) as amended by section 11 
of Act 24 of 2011 empowers the court to fix and vary the remuneration 
payable to a receiver on the application of the company concerned or its 
liquidator subject to the prescribed fees payable to a receiver. In other 
words, the court’s power to fix or vary a receiver’s remuneration cannot 
be exercised without regard to the prescribed fees. 
Section 118(2) provides that a receiver may be required by court, 
on its own motion or on the application of the registrar or an interested 
person, to make a report to the registrar on a matter the receiver may 
have information about in relation to the company. The court has power, 
in terms of section 118A(1)(c) and (3) as amended by section 13 of Act 24 
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of 2011, to remove a receiver from office on the application of the holder 
of a debenture in respect of which the receiver was appointed. 
According to section 122(2)(b), the court has supervisory 
jurisdiction in respect of offers to the public to acquire shares in a 
company that is not a public company. 
Lastly, the court may, on the application of the registrar, make 
any of the following orders: an order cancelling the registration and 
halting the offer of shares to the public; an order declaring voidable any 
contract for the acquisition of shares offered in the prospectus; an order 
for the reissue of the prospectus with amendments; or an order 
protecting the rights of any persons adversely affected by the issuance of 
the prospectus.75 In addition, section 131(3) empowers the court to 
make such interim orders in relation to a prospectus as are necessary 
on the application of the registrar. 
Most of the powers highlighted under this subheading are 
properly within the province of the court. However, some of the powers – 
such as the power to order the holding of a debenture holders’ meeting – 
should probably not lie with the court; they could properly be vested in 
a regulatory body better suited to perform functions of an administrative 
nature. 
 
3.2.3. Powers relating to management and 
administration 
Section 144(1) empowers the court to order the convening of a 
meeting of a company on its own motion or on the application of a 
director or member of the company. 
A company must avail to members and other persons, such books 
or records as the Companies Act requires it to make available. According 
to section 193(6), non-compliance with this requirement entitles a 
                                                          
75 Ibid s 131(1) and (2). 
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dissatisfied person to apply to court for an order compelling the 
company to be compliant and imposing liability for costs of the 
application on the company and any officer thereof in breach of the said 
requirement. 
Section 207(1) provides that a person may be disqualified or 
prevented from being appointed a director of a company by the court. 
It is also noteworthy that, in terms of section 211(1), the court has 
jurisdiction to hear a claim for damages at the instance of a director of a 
company removed from office by way of an ordinary resolution of the 
company in breach of contract. According to subsection (3), where it is 
proposed to remove a director from office by ordinary resolution, the 
director is entitled to a hearing on the proposed resolution; to send a 
written statement on the matter to the company; and to require the 
written statement to be read to the meeting at which the director’s 
removal is to be proposed. The court is empowered by subsection (5), on 
application by the company or any other aggrieved person alleging 
unreasonable length of the director’s statement or abuse of the rights 
conferred on the director proposed to be removed from office, to order 
that the statement should neither be circulated nor read to the relevant 
meeting. 
Subsections (1) and (7) of section 225 require a company to 
maintain a register of securities held by or in trust for directors and the 
company secretary and make it available for inspection by a member, 
debenture holder or agent of the registrar. Subsection (11) provides that 
the court may order immediate inspection of the register if the company 
fails to avail it for the purpose. 
Lastly, section 230(1) empowers the court, on its own motion or 
on the application of the registrar, trustee in bankruptcy of the person 
concerned or liquidator of a body corporate, to permit the appointment 




The majority of the powers in relation to the management and 
administration of companies can properly be exercised by an 
administrative regulatory body as opposed to the current situation 
where the court may be called upon to make such orders as directing a 
company to avail certain books and records for inspection by its own 
members or ordering a company to hold a meeting of the company. 
  
3.2.4. Powers relating to fundamental transactions 
Fundamental transactions for present purposes are schemes of 
arrangement, take-overs and protection of minority rights in companies. 
According to section 234(2), a company, creditor, member or 
liquidator of a company party to a proposed compromise or arrangement 
may apply to court for an order to convene and hold a meeting of 
creditors or class of creditors, or of members or class of members to 
consider the compromise or arrangement. In other words, the court may 
order the convening and holding of a meeting of interested parties to 
consider a compromise or arrangement. Further, the court may approve 
a compromise or arrangement.76  Where the compromise or arrangement 
involves a reconstruction or amalgamation of companies, section 236(1) 
empowers the court to make orders additional to approval of a 
compromise or arrangement including provision for transfer of 
undertaking and property or liabilities of a transferor company to the 
transferee company. 
Section 239 empowers the court to make orders to protect a 
member or members of a company from oppressive77 conduct of the 
company’s affairs or exercise of directors’ powers. 
                                                          
76 Ibid s 234(6)(b)(i), (7), (9) and (10). 
77 Section 239(1) of the Companies Act defines the term ‘oppressive’ to mean conduct 
that is ‘oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a 
member or members of a company; or …contrary to the interests of the members as a 
whole; whether in the capacity of the member or members concerned as a member or 
members of the company, or otherwise’. 
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The powers vested in the court in respect of fundamental 
transactions are properly within the court’s jurisdiction. However, some 
fundamental transactions may be time-sensitive and the courts may not 
always be responsive to this issue. 
 
3.2.5. Powers relating to winding-up 
Section 269(1) provides that the court generally has jurisdiction to 
wind-up companies in Zambia. The court may, in terms of section 
257(4), also wind-up a foreign company on a number of grounds 
including trading for an unlawful purpose in Zambia. According to 
section 280(1), it is also within the court’s power to appoint a provisional 
liquidator after the filing of a winding-up petition but prior to issuance 
of a winding up order. Further, section 297(1) empowers the court to 
appoint a special manager of the business or estate of a company in 
liquidation on the request of the company’s liquidator. In addition, 
section 297(2)(d) empowers the court to remove a special manager from 
office. 
The court may, in terms of section 285(1) as amended by section 
24 of Act 24 of 2011, fix the remuneration of a liquidator if the liquidator 
and committee of inspection (where there is one) fail to agree on the 
remuneration or, where there is no committee of inspection, if creditors 
fail to pass an extraordinary resolution fixing the remuneration. 
According to section 298(1), the court has power to set a date by 
which creditors ought to prove their debts or claims and beyond which 
they would lose their right to prove such debts or claims. In addition, 
subsection (3) stipulates that where the assets of a company in 
liquidation are not enough to meet the company’s liabilities, the court 
may set the perking order for the payment of winding-up costs and 
expenses. 
Section 299 provides that after a winding-up order has been 
made, the court may order that the company being wound-up make 
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available its books and other records for inspection by members of the 
company and its creditors. 
It is also within the court’s power to summon a person – 
presumably to furnish certain information about a company being 
wound-up – the court thinks is capable of availing information regarding 
the incorporation, undertaking, affairs or property of the company.78  
Further, section 301(1) provides that a liquidator who determines 
that a wrong has been done against the company in respect of which the 
liquidator has been appointed may render a report to that effect to the 
court and the court may order the examination before it of any person 
capable of giving information regarding the incorporation or business 
dealings of the company. In addition, the court has power to order the 
arrest of a member, officer, former member or former officer of a 
company being wound-up where it is proved to the court that the person 
in question is likely to leave the country, abscond or transfer the 
person’s property in order to evade payment of a debt that may be due 
from the person to the company.79 
Section 312(1) clothes the court with the discretion to order the 
stay of a voluntary winding up on the application of the liquidator or 
member of the company following a special resolution by the company 
staying the winding-up proceedings. 
Where it is proposed to sell or dispose of the whole or part of the 
undertaking or property of a company the subject of a creditors’ 
voluntary winding-up to another body corporate, the court may, in 
terms of section 322(1), approve the receipt by the company’s liquidator 
of fully paid shares or debentures in the other body corporate as 
consideration for the sale or disposal. The court is further empowered to 
give binding directions to the parties concerned for the initiation and 
conduct of arbitration where a member of the company expresses 
                                                          
78 Companies Act s 300(1). 
79 Ibid s 302(1). 
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dissent to the liquidator regarding a special resolution in a members’ 
voluntary winding-up authorising the liquidator to receive fully paid 
shares or debentures of an acquiring body corporate where it is 
proposed to sell or dispose of the company’s undertaking or property.80 
Section 325(2) empowers the court to settle a dispute regarding 
‘the value of any security or lien or the amount of a debt or set-off’81 at 
the centre of an arrangement between a company about to be, or in the 
course of being, wound-up on the one hand and its creditors on the 
other. Subsection (3) authorises the court to determine – by way of 
amendment, variation or confirmation of arrangement – an appeal by a 
member of such a company or its creditor against a completed 
arrangement if brought within 21 days from the date of the 
arrangement’s completion. 
According to section 328, a company the subject of a compulsory 
winding-up on account of inability to pay its debts can only resolve to be 
wound-up voluntarily if the court grants it leave to do so. 
The court is empowered, in terms of section 358(1), to order an 
officer or liquidator of a company who has misapplied or misused the 
company’s money or property to pay back the money or restore the 
property to the company. 
Lastly, section 362(1) provides that the court may declare the 
dissolution of a company void at the instance of the company’s 
liquidator or any other interested person. 
The winding-up of a company is both a serious and time-sensitive 
matter. While the time factor may make maintenance of the status an 
unattractive idea, it is suggested that the nature of winding-up makes 
recourse to the court a necessary evil. 
 
 
                                                          
80 Ibid s 322(7)(c). 
81 Ibid s 325(2). 
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3.2.6. Other powers 
The court may, in terms of section 376(2), compel a company in 
breach of its duty to file returns or other documents to do so on the 
application of the registrar, a member or creditor of the company. 
Section 379 grants jurisdiction to the court to reverse, confirm or 
vary a decision of the registrar that has been appealed against. It is also 
within the court’s jurisdiction, on the application of a member, creditor 
or liquidator of a company, to attach civil liability to a person who 
knowingly acquiesced to fraudulent trading by the company.82 Further, 
section 387 provides that where persons are jointly liable in damages or 
costs for any breach of the Companies Act, the court may order each 
person so liable to contribute towards the settlement of the damages or 
costs, or exempt a person from liability. Section 388(1) empowers the 
court to grant relief from civil liability to certain persons such as officers 
of a company for their honest but actionable deeds or omissions. 
 
3.3. Companies Act offences 
It is interesting to note that the Companies Act arguably creates 
more offences than the possible civil actions it expressly provides for.83 
This being the case, only some of the offences are highlighted under this 
subheading;84 and to this end a deliberate attempt is made to balance 
                                                          
82 Ibid s 383(1). 
83 There are about 86 provisions in the Act creating offences as compared to a 
combined estimate of 80 provisions on appealable decisions of the registrar and powers 
of the court. 
84 As this is not a treatise on criminal law, it is not necessary to describe albeit briefly 
all offences created by the Act. That said, the provisions of the Act  that create offences 
and are not highlighted under the subheading are ss 64(4) and (5), 66(3), 74(6), 81(1) 
and (2), 82(8), 83(14) and (15), 87(4), 89(2), 90(2), 91(2), 92(4), 97(4), 104(3), 105(2) 
and (3), 111(5) as amended by s 9 of Act 24 of 2011, 115(2), 117(2), 118A(7) as 
amended by s 13 of Act 24 of 2011, 125(6), 138(3), 151(9) and (10), 155(4), 158(4) and 
(5), 160(4), 162(7), 169(2), 170(3) and (4), 171(7), 172(8), 176(3) and (4), 182(5) and (6), 
192(5), 193(6), 194(2), 203(3) and (5), 204(2), 205(9), 207(3), 212(2), 218(10), 219(6), 
223(2) and (3), 224(3) and (4) as amended by section 20 of Act 24 of 2011, 225(9) and 
(10), 226(3), 228(3), 234(12) and (13), 235(7) and (9), 236(4), 239(9), 246(2), 256(3), 
259(1) and (2), 279(3), 286(4), 287(8) and (11), 292(6), 296(4), 305(4), 308(4), 311(6), 
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between a highlight of the minor offences punishable only by a fine and 
the apparently more serious offences punishable by either a fine or 
imprisonment, or both a fine and imprisonment. It should be noted on 
the one hand that most offences are punishable by a fine, and those 
highlighted hereunder and punishable only by a fine do not contain a 
statement indicating the punishment. On the other hand, the offences 
that may be punishable by imprisonment and considered hereunder are 
expressly stated to be so punishable. 
Subsections (1) and (3) of section 5 provide that if a business 
association or partnership that is not a body corporate has more than 
20 members or partners, the members or partners thereof commit an 
offence. 
A failure by a company or officer thereof to lodge a copy of a 
special resolution amending the company’s articles of association within 
the prescribed timeframe after its passage is, according to section 8(4), 
an offence. Interestingly, it is also an offence in terms of section 189 as 
amended by section 15 of Act 24 of 2011 for a company to fail or neglect 
to file annual returns or any other documents required to be filed under 
the relevant division. 
It is also an offence, according to section 19(7), for a company 
limited by guarantee to carry on business for purposes of making a 
profit for its members. In addition subsections (4) and (8) provide that a 
company limited by guarantee commits an offence if it does not notify 
the registrar – within seven days of its occurrence – of a person’s 
becoming, or ceasing to be, a member of the company. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
312(7), 314(15) and (16), 323(3), 324(8), 337(4), 338(6), 339(2), 340(4), 362(4), 380(9), 




A failure by a company to avail copies of the certificate of 
incorporation, share capital or articles of association to a member within 
a prescribed period after the member’s request for them is an offence.85 
Subsections (1) and (7) of section 36 make it an offence for a 
company not to lodge an application for conversion to another company 
type within the prescribed period after meeting the conversion criteria.  
According to section 36(8) a director, secretary or auditor of a 
company commits an offence if they make a declaration of solvency 
without a reasonable basis. 
Further, section 44(2) provides that a company that does not 
notify the registrar of the fact of another body corporate becoming 
related to the company within the prescribed period after becoming 
related commits an offence. 
Section 47 stipulates that it is an offence for a private company to 
have more or fewer members than prescribed by its articles of 
association. A company’s failure to maintain a register of members is, 
according to section 48(3), an offence. Section 50(5) provides that where 
a company is ordered by the court to rectify its register of members and 
the company does not lodge a copy of the order with the registrar within 
the prescribed period, the company commits an offence. In addition, 
section 51(6) makes it an offence for a company required to maintain a 
branch register of some of its members, to neglect or fail to maintain 
such a register. 
It is an offence, in terms of section 59(13), for a company that 
redeems any redeemable shares not to notify the registrar of the 
redemption within the prescribed period. A company that varies any 
rights associated with a class of shares ought to lodge relevant 
documentation relating to the variation with the registrar within the 
                                                          
85 Companies Act s 29(1) and (4). 
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prescribed period failing which the company commits an offence.86 
Section 63(1) provides that when a company makes an allotment of 
shares, it must file a return of the allotment with the registrar within 
one month of the allotment failing which the company commits an 
offence. 
The offer of securities to the public in contravention of section 122 
is an offence for which an offender may be sentenced to imprisonment 
for up to two years. In addition, the authorisation of publication of a 
prospectus that contains untrue statements or omissions of truthful 
statements is – according to section 130(1) – a serious offence for which 
one can be imprisoned for up to seven years. 
According to section 230(1), a court87 may order a person 
convicted of an offence involving fraud, breach of duty during winding-
up of a company, or in relation to the creation or management of a body 
corporate not to be involved in the management of a company or become 
a director thereof. Subsection (7) makes it an offence to disobey such an 
order; and a person who disobeys the order may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for up to two years. In addition, section 239(8) provides 
that a person who disobeys an oppressive remedy order applicable to the 
person commits an offence for which the person may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for a maximum period of one year. In any case disobeying 
a court order is contempt of court. 
Section 252(7) stipulates that a failure by a foreign company to, 
among other things, maintain accounting records is an offence for which 
an officer of the company may be sent to prison for up to two years. 
Section 287(9) provides that a person who does not verify a 
statement of affairs of a company being wound-up within the prescribed 
period when properly required to do so, commits an offence and may be 
                                                          
86 Ibid s 62(10). 
87 The term ‘court’ in this context may, in terms of section 230(2) of the Act, include 
the subordinate courts of foreign courts. 
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imprisoned for a period of up to three months. Section 109B(a) as 
amended by section 8 of Act 24 of 2011 makes it an offence to, among 
others, neglect or fail to verify a statement of affairs of a company in 
receivership; and a person found guilty thereof may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for a maximum period of one year. It is interesting to note 
the different maximum prison terms prescribed for these similar 
offences. 
It is also an offence for a person to act or continue acting as a 
receiver or liquidator when ineligible for appointment or incompetent to 
continue as such.88 In the case of an ineligible or incompetent person 
acting as a liquidator, a sentence of up to six months in prison may be 
imposed whereas an ineligible or incompetent person acting as a 
receiver may be sentenced to a prison term of up to two years.89 
Section 353(1) provides for a plethora of offences – generally 
bordering on dishonesty – that may be committed by officers or 
members (past and present) of a company that is being wound-up. The 
maximum period of imprisonment for these offences is two years. In 
addition, subsection (3) makes it an offence for a person to knowingly 
accept in pledge or otherwise, property pledged in circumstances 
constituting an offence in terms of the section. A prison term of up to six 
months may be imposed for this offence. 
Moreover, section 354 provides that a person who seeks to secure 
appointment as liquidator by inducement or reward to a creditor or 
member of a company commits an offence for which the person could be 
sentenced to imprisonment for a maximum of two years. 
An officer or member of a company being wound-up who falsifies 
any document of the company with fraudulent or deceptive intention 
commits an offence for which the officer or member may be imprisoned 
                                                          




for up to two years.90 Further, section 356 provides that a failure by a 
company being wound-up to maintain proper accounts is an offence for 
which a defaulting officer of the company may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for a maximum period of one year. In addition, it is an 
offence in terms of section 357(1) for an officer of a company to 
knowingly allow the company to contract a debt the officer does not 
reasonably expect the company to pay. The officer could go to prison for 
up to three months for this offence. 
Section 360 provides for a number of fraud-related offences an 
officer of a company that ends up passing a voluntary winding-up 
resolution or being compulsorily wound-up may commit. The maximum 
sentence for these offences is two years. 
According to section 380(9), it is an offence for a company to 
either disobey an order of the registrar for the company to furnish 
certain information and statistics about itself or furnish incomplete or 
wrong information and statistics. An officer of a company may be 
imprisoned for up to three months for this offence. Subsection (10) 
makes it an offence for a person to wilfully disobey the Registrar’s order; 
and such a person may suffer imprisonment for a maximum period of 
three months. 
It is also an offence, in terms of section 381(1), for a person to 
make a false statement in any ‘document required by or for the 
purposes of’ the Act. The maximum sentence of imprisonment for this 
offence is two years. 
Lastly, section 384 criminalises fraudulent trading and prescribes 
a maximum prison sentence of one year. 
 It is clear that the Companies Act creates many offences. As the 
discourse above has shown, some of the breaches of the Act for which 
criminal sanctions are imposed can be dealt with administratively. There 
                                                          
90 Companies Act s 355. 
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is need to amend the Act in order to reclassify some, if not most, of the 
offences as civil wrongs that attract non-criminal sanctions as the 
status quo may arguably have a chilling effect on enterprise growth and 
development – let alone the ease of doing business. 
 
4.0. Conclusion 
It cannot be denied that the Companies Act dispute resolution 
framework is predominantly court-based. Resolving disputes through 
the courts is generally expensive and time consuming. Reforms aimed at 
enhancing Zambia’s competitiveness vis-à-vis the ease of doing business 
ought to seriously look into the cost of dispute resolution. The Zambian 
business environment can be a lot friendlier if progressive alternative 
means of resolving company law disputes are introduced.  
The courts are inundated with all manner of cases; and reforming 
the Companies Act dispute resolution framework would provide some 
welcome relief on them. It has been demonstrated that there are matters 
– especially the registrar’s decisions – of such an administrative nature 
that the courts are hardly the suitable fora for their resolution.  
It has been acknowledged that, given the gravity and substantive 
nature of some matters, the courts are arguably the appropriate fora for 
them. These include matters to do with offers of securities to the public 
and winding-up of companies.  
The Companies Act can almost be classified as a penal law 
because it creates too many offences for a business regulation statute. 
Some of the offences, especially those attracting only minimal fines as 
sanctions, can properly be dealt with administratively. To this end, the 
need for amendments to be made to the Act so as to reclassify some of 
the offences as civil wrongs that can be redressed administratively has 
been canvassed. 
The exact nature or form of the required reforms remains to be 
determined. This being the case it is only proper that jurisdictions 
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whose company law dispute resolution regimes provide for fora 
additional to the traditional courts be studied with a view to 
recommending a suitable model for Zambia. The next chapter offers a 
comparative perspective of company law dispute resolution frameworks 



























CHAPTER THREE – CURRENT TRENDS IN COMPANY LAW 




The famous adage that ‘no man is an island’ applies as much to 
persons as it does to nations. There is not a single country that can 
claim to have a perfect justice system. Even those countries that have 
fairly successful justice systems have had to ‘borrow’ an idea or two 
from another country. It is common practice – almost standard – for 
countries to undertake studies of other countries in respect of sectors 
that the former countries intend to effect reforms.  
That the Zambian company law dispute resolution framework is in 
need of reform has been established in the preceding chapter. This 
chapter offers a comparative perspective of current trends in company 
law dispute resolution with a view to informing the specific proposals for 
reform in respect of the Zambian company law dispute resolution 
framework.  
The Australian, South African and Indian company law dispute 
resolution frameworks are discussed seriatim. The justification for the 
choice of these jurisdictions was given in the first chapter and is not 
repeated in this chapter.  
It will be discovered that the three jurisdictions discussed are 
unanimous in so far as the use of a tribunal for the resolution of certain 
company law disputes is concerned. However, some marked variations 
in the extent of the jurisdiction vested in the respective tribunals will be 
evident, with India’s National Company Law Tribunal and South Africa’s 







2.1. Corporations Act dispute resolution framework 
Part 9 of the Corporations Act 50 of 2001 (in this paper referred to 
as ‘the Corporations Act’) contains fairly detailed provisions on dispute 
resolution. The courts play a central role in the resolution of criminal 
and civil Corporations Act disputes. The Corporations Act provides for 
certain decisions to be reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 
As the Administrative Appeals Tribunal is the focus of the next 
subheading, it is not discussed under this subheading. However, some 
brief comments are apt on the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the 
courts in relation to Corporations Act disputes before highlighting some 
of the disputes reserved for the courts are highlighted. 
Australian courts have both civil and criminal jurisdiction vis-à-
vis the Corporations Act.91 With the exception of matters reserved for the 
tribunal, civil and criminal Corporations Act disputes are amenable to 
the courts’ jurisdiction. The powers of the courts, in so far as they are 
relevant for present purposes, are highlighted in respect of civil matters 
as an indication of the nature of disputes that the Act reserves to the 
courts. Some of the offences are also highlighted in order to give an 
indication of the extent to which Australian company law, in so far as is 
material to this paper, provides for criminal sanctions in respect of some 
matters. 
It is interesting to note that section 58AA(2) of the Corporations 
Act provides that civil or criminal proceedings in terms of the Act may 
generally be brought in any court. This is unlike in Zambia where civil 
proceedings in terms of the Companies Act can only be brought before 
the High Court.92 While the option of bringing proceedings before any 
court has the advantage of possibly enhancing the speedy disposal of 
                                                          
91 See Part 9.6A of the Corporations Act. 
92 Supra 11. 
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cases, there is a risk of conflicting decisions being made in respect of 
materially similar cases. 
 
2.2. Selected Corporations Act matters reserved for the 
courts 
2.2.1. Civil matters 
The courts’ powers in selected civil matters are instructive in so 
far as giving an indication of the nature of civil matters reserved or left 
to the courts. First, the court is empowered, in terms of sections 206C, 
206D and 206E of the Corporations Act, to disqualify a person from 
managing corporations on the application of the Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission (ASIC). It should be noted in addition that 
the court may grant a disqualified person permission to manage 
corporations.93 
According to sections 232 and 233, the court may make such 
orders as provide redress against the oppressive conduct of a company’s 
affairs. 
Further, section 249G empowers the court to order the convening 
of a meeting of the members of a company where it is not practicable to 
convene the meeting another way. The court is also empowered to order 
the holding of a debenture holders’ meeting to give directions to a 
trustee.94 Section 1319 of the Act provides that the court may give 
necessary directions regarding the convening and holding of these 
meetings. 
Section 425 empowers the court to fix a receiver’s remuneration. It 
is also within the court’s power, in terms of section 434A and 434B, to 
remove a receiver or controller of a company’s property from office for 
misconduct or redundancy. 
                                                          
93 Corporations Act s 206G. 
94 Ibid s 283EC. 
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The court may wind-up a company in certain circumstances.95 
The court may also make a wide range of orders in connection with 
winding-up. For example, the court may stay a company’s winding-up in 
terms of section 482; make an order preventing an officer of a company 
or related person avoiding liability in certain instances;96 and declare 
certain transactions voidable97. 
The court has power, in terms of section 1303, to compel a person 
refusing to avail certain books or records for inspection when required to 
do so by the Act, to avail such books or records for inspection. 
Section 1318 confers on the court a general power to grant relief 
from liability to a person who acts honestly but in breach of a duty owed 
by the person to a company or another person. 
It is noteworthy that there are striking similarities between the 
jurisdiction of the Australian courts and that of the Zambian High Court 
in respect of company law matters. The Corporations Act matters that 
have been highlighted above are similar to some of the Companies Act 
matters over which the High Court has jurisdiction.98 
 
2.2.2. Criminal matters 
 The Corporations Act creates a plethora of offences spread over 
several sections. A few of the offences are highlighted here. According to 
section 184(1), it is an offence for a director or other officer of a company 
to be reckless or intentionally dishonest and act in bad faith in the 
discharge of their duties. A director or other officer of a company also 
commits an offence if they use their position as such to dishonestly or 
recklessly benefit themselves.99 
                                                          
95 Ibid s 461. 
96 Ibid s 486A. 
97 Ibid s 588FF. 
98 Supra 26 – 37. 
99 Corporations Act s 184(2). 
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Section 595 provides that a person who gives another person 
valuable consideration with the view of securing an appointment as 
liquidator commits an offence. 
A company that publishes or advertises ‘a statement of the 
amount of its capital that is misleading’100 commits an offence.101 
According to section 1309, it is an offence for an officer or employee of a 
company to avail false information relating to the affairs of the company 
to certain persons. 
It is also an offence, in terms of section 1310, to hinder or 
obstruct ASIC in the performance of its functions. 
Lastly, it is interesting to note that except where a provision 
prohibiting certain conduct states otherwise in terms of the specified 
chapters102 of the Act, any conduct prohibited by the Act is an offence. It 
is clear from this one provision that, with a whopping 1 525 sections 
containing a myriad of prohibitions and requirements, the Corporations 
Act may not be the best example of a company law dispute resolution 
model that emphasises non-criminal sanctions. It is probably worse 
than the Companies Act, which has just about 86 provisions relating to 
offences.103  
 
2.3. Matters reserved for the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal 
2.3.1. General overview 
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal is a creature of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act and consists of ‘a President, the 
other presidential members, the senior members, and other members’104 
                                                          
100 Ibid s 1308. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid s 1311(1A). 
103 Supra 38 (note 83). 
104 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act s 5. 
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appointed by the Governor-General105. The Act does not prescribe a 
fixed number of members the tribunal should have. It appears that the 
number of members the tribunal should have at any time is demand 
driven. It would have been better for the Act to contain a provision 
relating to the effect that such number of members as is considered 
necessary shall be appointed. There is potential for abuse of discretion 
when parameters regarding the number of members the tribunal should 
have are not properly defined.  
The tribunal had 89 members as of June 2014,106 representing a 
marginal increase of two in the membership from the previous year.107 
Section 7 sets out the qualifications for appointment as member of 
the tribunal, with enrolment as a legal practitioner featuring as a 
qualification for most of the categories of membership. Apart from 
members who are judges and whose membership terminates on their 
ceasing to be judges, the tenure of office for members is a maximum of 
seven years with eligibility for re-appointment.108 
The tribunal’s mandate is to review administrative decisions of 
‘…Government ministers, departments, agencies and some other 
tribunals’109. The tribunal reviews the merits of administrative 
decisions;110 and in doing so, it takes a fresh look at the factual, legal 
and policy considerations at play in the making of the decisions being 
reviewed. The tribunal may ‘affirm, vary or set aside’111 a decision the 
                                                          
105 Ibid s 6(1). 
106 Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) ‘Annual Report 2013 - 14’ (2014) 13 available 
at http://www.aat.gov.au/docs/Reports/2014/AR1314-complete.pdf accessed on 11 
February 2015. 
107 Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) ‘Annual Report 2012 - 13’ (2013) 14 available 
at http://www.aat.gov.au/docs/Reports/2013/AR2013.pdf accessed on 11 February 
2015. 
108 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act s 8. 
109 AAT op cit note 107 at 12. 
110 Margaret Allars ‘The nature of merits review: a bold vision realized in the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal’ (2013) 41 Fed. L. Rev. 197 available at 
http://www.heinonline.org.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.jour
nals/fedlr41&page=197&collection=journals accessed on 11 February 2015.  
111 AAT op cit note 107 at 12; see also Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act s 3(3). 
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subject of review. It should be noted that the tribunal can only review 
decisions that legislation makes amenable to review by it.112 According 
to section 19(1) and (2), the tribunal’s powers are exercised through its 
various divisions. An appeal from a decision of the tribunal lies to the 
Federal Court.113  
According to section 33, the tribunal is required to conduct its 
proceedings ‘with as little formality and technicality, and with as much 
expedition, as the requirements of the Act and a proper consideration of 
the matters before the [t]ribunal permit’114. The tribunal is designed to 
deliver justice in a flexible and timely manner at low cost to the 
parties.115 It is noteworthy that the tribunal is not bound by strict rules 
of evidence. 
Further, and to enhance the number of applications resolved 
without a hearing, the tribunal ‘uses alternative dispute resolution to 
help the parties try to reach agreement about how their case should be 
resolved’116. It also strives to conclude cases within 12 months from the 
date of their being lodged. Possibly due to its case management system, 
the tribunal concluded 82 per cent of cases filed within 12 months of 
their being filed and resolved 82 per cent of cases without a hearing in 
the 2013 – 14 financial year.117 
While its performance appears to be generally encouraging, the 
tribunal sometimes fails to deliver within set timelines due to delays 
occasioned by several factors, including the need to accord parties more 
time to resolve issues without a hearing; the need for parties to get 
expert evidence; the need to stay proceedings pending conclusion of a 
similar matter by the responsible government agency or court; 
                                                          
112 Ibid; see also Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act s 25(1). 
113 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act s 44. 
114 AAT op cit note 107 at 12. 
115 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act s 2A. 
116 AAT op cit note 106 at 29; see also Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act ss 34 – 4H. 
117 Ibid at 30. 
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unavailability of parties due to such factors as illness; and delays in 
delivering of tribunal decisions after the hearing.118 
It is illusory to think that tribunals are free from some of the 
challenges that contribute to delays in the disposal of cases by the 
courts. The tribunal has been operational for close to 40 years but, as 
indicated in the preceding paragraph, still experiences some challenges 
in delivering on its mandate within set timeframes. 
These challenges notwithstanding, the tribunal appears – to a 
large extent – to provide ‘independent merits review of administrative 
decisions … [in a] fair, just, economical, informal and quick [manner]’119. 
To the extent that it has been largely successful, the tribunal presents a 
useful case study for a country looking to address the perennial problem 
of delays in the dispensation of some aspects administrative justice. 
 
2.3.2. Jurisdiction in relation to the Corporations Act 
Part 9.4A of the Corporations Act contains provisions on review by 
the tribunal of certain decisions. Section 1317B provides that certain 
decisions of the Minister, ASIC and the Companies Auditors and 
Liquidators Disciplinary Board are amenable to review by the tribunal. 
For purposes of this paper, only the relevant reviewable decisions of 
ASIC are highlighted due to the nature of the study. 
It should be noted from the outset that section 1317C exempts 
some decisions of ASIC from review by the tribunal. The list of these 
non-reviewable decisions is fairly long and is not reproduced herein. 
However, it is interesting to note that a decision of ASIC to deregister or 
refuse to deregister a company in terms of section 601AB is not 
reviewable.120 Suffice to reiterate that the ASIC decisions highlighted 
herein are reviewable by the tribunal. 
                                                          
118 Ibid at 32. 
119 AAT op cit note 107 at 12. 
120 Corporations Act s 1317C(d) and (e). 
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One of the decisions ASIC is empowered to make is registration of 
a company in terms of section 118. A refusal by ASIC to register a 
company is reviewable by the tribunal. In addition, a person who is 
aggrieved by the decision of ASIC to register or refuse to register a 
company limited by guarantee without the word “Limited” in its name 
may apply to the tribunal for review of the decision.121 ASIC’s change of 
a company name to include the word “Limited” where a company 
granted an exemption from the use of the word breaches any 
requirement or obligation based upon which the exemption was granted 
is a reviewable decision. Further, section 152 provides that a refusal by 
ASIC to reserve a name is reviewable. The tribunal may also, in terms of 
section 158(1), review a decision of ASIC to direct a company to change 
its name. Section 164 empowers ASIC to change a company from one 
type to another. 
Further, the power of ASIC to disqualify a person from managing 
corporations in certain circumstances is reviewable.122 
According to section 739, ASIC may make an order stopping the 
offer, issue, sale or transfer of securities to members of the public where 
the disclosure documents (the equivalent of the prospectus in the 
Zambian context) lodged with ASIC contain, among other things, 
misleading or ambiguous statements. Such a decision is reviewable. In 
addition, the tribunal may also review a decision by ASIC to exempt a 
person from the application to the person of the provisions of chapter 
6D (relating to the raising of funds by companies) of the Act.123 
Sections 1279 and 1282 provide that ASIC is empowered to 
register liquidators. It follows that the registration of, or refusal to 
register, a liquidator by ASIC is amenable to review. A decision of ASIC 
                                                          
121 Ibid s 150(1). 
122 Ibid s 206F. 
123 Ibid s 741. 
54 
 
to cancel or suspend the registration of a liquidator if not made at the 
request of the liquidator is also reviewable.124 
The tribunal, it is clear, can only review those decisions of ASIC 
that the Corporations Act allows it to. It is reiterated that the tribunal 
reviews administrative decisions. In this regard, the Australian company 
law dispute resolution model differs from the Zambian paradigm, which 
makes all decisions of the registrar amenable to appeal to the High 
Court and not a tribunal. 
 
3.0. South Africa 
3.1. Companies Act 2008 dispute resolution framework 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (in this paper referred to as ‘the 
Companies Act 2008’) provides for four dispute resolution options, 
namely: voluntary dispute resolution through mediation, conciliation125 
or arbitration; adjudication by the Companies Tribunal; bringing an 
action in the High Court; or filing a complaint before the Companies and 
Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC).126 This approach contrasts 
with the Australian approach where the courts and the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal are the principal dispute resolution fora. 
The courts and the tribunal as dispute resolution fora are 
considered under later subheadings. Therefore, a few comments on the 
other dispute resolution fora are apt. A person entitled to relief in terms 
of the Companies Act 2008 may, instead of seeking redress in the High 
Court or filing a complaint before the CIPC, refer a matter to mediation, 
conciliation or arbitration before the tribunal, an accredited alternative 
                                                          
124 Ibid ss 1290 and 1290A(1). 
125 Conciliation has been defined as ‘[a] process in which a neutral person meets with 
the parties to a dispute and explores how the dispute might be resolved; … a relatively 
unstructured method of dispute resolution in which a third party facilitates 
communication between the parties in an attempt to help them settle their differences’. 
B Garner op cit note 37 at 329. 
126 Companies Act 2008 s 156. 
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dispute resolution provider (‘ADR provider’) or other person.127 Where 
this process fails, the tribunal or ADR provider must issue a certificate 
to that effect.  
The Act does not expressly state what recourse a party to a failed 
mediation, conciliation or arbitration process has thereafter. However, it 
appears that – in the absence of an express bar to the use of the other 
dispute resolution options – a party to a failed mediation, conciliation or 
arbitration may have recourse to one of the other dispute resolution 
options. It is unlikely though that the tribunal adjudication option 
would be tenable if the tribunal was involved in the mediation, 
conciliation or arbitration process. This is because of the possibility of 
the tribunal sitting twice as an arbiter in the same matter, especially if it 
was an arbitrator in the dispute. This being the case, the courts would 
be the probable avenue to pursue for recourse where the mediation, 
conciliation or arbitration process fails. 
According to section 167, a section 166 dispute resolution process 
may culminate in a consent order, which must be confirmed by a court. 
It is noteworthy that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal is also 
mandated to and uses alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to 
resolve Corporations Act matters in its purview without the need to 
conduct a hearing.128 
That the CIPC can, in terms of section 168(1)(b), hear and 
determine complaints alleging contravention of the Act or infringement 
of an applicant’s rights, memorandum of incorporation or company’s 
rules is an interesting innovation. The CIPC has a broad mandate in 
respect of complaints other than those specifically reserved for the Take-
Over Regulation Panel. It is also interesting to note that the CIPC may 
initiate a complaint to itself on its own motion or at the request of 
                                                          
127 Ibid s 166(1). 
128 Supra 51.  
56 
 
another regulatory body.129 This is rather strange because it makes the 
CIPC a judge in its own cause contrary to rules of natural justice. If the 
intention – as it probably was – was to ensure the CIPC’s proactivity in 
its enforcement role in terms of the Act, requiring the CIPC to file a 
complaint before the tribunal for instance would have implemented the 
intention without attacking the rule of natural justice against being a 
judge in one’s own cause. Perhaps amendments to the Act to address 
this anomaly should be considered. 
The Take-Over Regulation Panel’s mandate is specific to 
consideration of complaints relating to take-overs.130  
The four-pronged approach to dispute resolution is innovative and 
progressive. However, the risk inherent in this approach is the 
possibility of conflicting decisions being arrived at by the arbiters or 
adjudicators on similar matters brought by different persons before 
different dispute resolution fora. While ‘a predictable and effective 
environment for the efficient regulation of companies’131 is one of the 
objectives of the Act132, the risk of unpredictability in the law is real 
because of the possibility of a lack of clear precedents on certain 
matters. This may make it difficult for legal practitioners to advise their 
clients with sufficient clarity and confidence. Therefore, proper 
coordination of the various dispute resolution fora is a potent tool for 
ensuring predictability and effectiveness of the enforcement aspect of 
the regulatory environment and framework.133 
 
3.2. Selected Companies Act 2008 matters for the courts 
The term ‘court’ is not defined in the interpretation section of the 
Companies Act 2008. The only definition of the word in the Act is in 
                                                          
129 Companies Act 2008 s 168(2). 
130 Ibid s 168(1)(a). 
131 Ibid s 7(l). 
132 Ibid; see also MF Cassim op cit note 31 at 825.  
133 D Farisani op cit note 31 at 445.  
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relation to the chapter on business rescue and compromises with 
creditors where it is defined as the High Court, a designated judge of the 
High Court or a judge of the High Court, with jurisdiction over a 
matter.134 This is unlike the Corporations Act of Australia, which defines 
court with reference to the whole Act.135 
While scholars and the Department of Trade and Industry appear 
to be unanimous that by court is meant the High Court ostensibly on 
the basis of section 156(c),136 this is rather a simplistic view of the issue. 
This is because, as will be noted in due course, in several sections of the 
Act a reference is made to court and yet in some of the provisions there 
is specific reference to the High Court. If the intention was that a 
reference to court indicated a reference to the High Court, there would 
have neither been a need for the definition in section 128(1)(e) nor 
provisions specifically requiring that certain matters should be brought 
in the High Court. In other words, it can be validly argued that 
references to court are not restricted to the High Court but any court of 
first instance. It would have made for greater certainty and clarity if the 
legislators had ascribed a specific meaning to court. 
The debate on what court means aside, the discussion under this 
subheading centres on relevant matters amenable to the courts’ 
jurisdiction. However, before the discussion on the said matters is 
embarked on, it should be pointed out that by virtue of section 156, 
seeking recourse from the courts is generally optional in that the Act 
provides for other avenues of getting disputes or matters resolved. The 
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and The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) ‘The Companies Act, No. 71 of 2008: 
An Explanatory Guide’ (2010) at 15 available at 




exercise of this right is said to be generally optional because there are 
provisions that make it mandatory to seek redress from the courts.137 
 
3.2.1. Civil matters 
One of the matters over which courts have jurisdiction in terms of 
section 16(1)(a) is amendment of a company’s memorandum of 
incorporation. A court may order that a memorandum of incorporation 
be amended. A court is also empowered to grant appropriate relief to a 
person whose interests would, among others, be adversely affected by a 
change of company type from a personal liability company arising by 
way of amendment of the company’s memorandum of incorporation.138 
In Australia, the jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes 
relating to change of company type lies with the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal.139 
It is interesting to note that subsections(4) and (5) of section 20 
expressly place the power to restrain a company or its directors from 
doing anything at variance with the memorandum of incorporation or 
the Act in the High Court. 
According to section 61(12), where a company fails to convene a 
shareholders’ meeting for reasons other than the lack of persons 
competent to convene such a meeting, a shareholder may apply to a 
court for an order that the meeting be convened.140 Similarly, the court 
is empowered to convene a shareholders’ meeting in terms of the 
Corporations Act.141 
Section 69(8)(a) provides that a court is empowered to disqualify a 
person from being a director of a company. In the case of Australia, it is 
                                                          
137 Companies Act 2008 s 48(5)(a) and (6). 
138 Ibid s 16(10) and (11). 
139 Supra 53. 
140 Section 61(11) requires an application for such a meeting to be made to the 
tribunal. This effectively means that a failure to convene the meeting for other reasons 
can only be redressed by a court. 
141 Supra 47. 
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not only the court that may disqualify a person from being a director but 
ASIC as well.142 However, as is the case in Australia,143 a court may 
permit a person who is ineligible to be a director of a company, to be a 
director in certain circumstances.144 
Further, the courts are empowered to order the winding-up of 
companies in circumstances specified in section 81(1). These 
circumstances include the passage of a special resolution by a solvent 
company to the effect that the company be wound-up by a court and 
where an application is made to court by a company ‘to have its 
winding-up continued by the court’145. It is also within the court’s 
jurisdiction to wind-up companies in certain circumstances in 
Australia.146 
It is also noteworthy that a court may, according to section 83(4), 
declare the dissolution of a company void. It is argued that the courts in 
Australia also have power to make such a declaration considering that 
ASIC’s decision to deregister a company is not amenable to review by the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal.147 
Moreover, a merger, amalgamation, scheme of arrangement or 
disposal of the whole or substantial part of a company’s assets cannot 
be implemented without, among others, the approval of a court where a 
resolution for any of those transactions is opposed by not less than 15 
per cent of voting rights exercised on the resolution.148 In addition, 
section 116(1) provides that a court may review an approved 
amalgamation or merger agreement on the application of a creditor 
alleging material prejudice of the transaction to the creditor. 
                                                          
142 Ibid at 47 and 52. 
143 Ibid at 47. 
144 Companies Act 2008 s 69(8)(b) and (11). 
145 Ibid s 81(1)(a). 
146 Supra 47 
147 Supra 52. 
148 Companies Act 2008 s 115(2)(c) and (3)(a). 
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Section 155(7) provides that a court is empowered to sanction a 
duly adopted compromise between a company and its creditors on the 
application of the company. 
According to section 160(4), a court may review a decision of the 
tribunal or notice issued by the CIPC in relation to company name 
registration. To the extent that an appeal from the decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal – which is empowered to review ASIC’s 
company name related decisions149 – lies to the Federal Court,150 it is 
arguable that the courts in the two countries are similarly empowered 
vis-à-vis company name dispute resolution. 
Furthermore, section 162 empowers a court to make an order 
protective of a securities holder’s rights. In addition, a court may in 
terms of section 163 make an order redressing oppressive or prejudicial 
conduct of a company’s affairs. The position is similar in Australia.151 
A court also has jurisdiction to determine the value of certain 
shares and order payment of the value so determined pursuant to 
shareholders’ appraisal rights provided for in section 164. 
According to section 195(7), a court has review and appellate 
jurisdiction in respect of decisions of the CIPC. Australian courts also 
have review and appellate jurisdiction in respect of decisions of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal.152 
It is interesting to note that a court may impose an administrative 
fine for a company’s failure to comply with a compliance notice.153 It 
would be neater if the jurisdiction to impose administrative fines, given 
their nature, were left to administrative regulatory bodies such as the 
tribunal. 
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3.2.2. Criminal matters 
In so far as offences are concerned, the Companies Act 2008 
creates far fewer offences than the Corporations Act of Australia.154 one 
of the offences provided for in the Companies Act 2008 is in section 
26(9), which stipulates that a failure to enable reasonable access to a 
record a company is obliged to make available for inspection or copying 
is an offence. It is also an offence, in terms of section 28(3), for a 
company to keep inaccurate or incomplete accounting records, or to 
falsify such records.155  
The preparation, approval or publication of materially false or 
misleading financial statements is an offence.156 A denial of access to a 
company’s financial statements or related records is, according to 
section 31(4), an offence. 
Section 32(5) provides, among other things, that a company that 
does not avail its registered name or number to a person on demand, or 
one that misleadingly misstates its name or registration number 
commits an offence. It is also an offence, in terms of the said section, for 
a company to use its name deceptively. 
According to section 213(1), disclosure of confidential information 
in certain instances is an offence punishable by a fine or a term of 
imprisonment of up to ten years.157 This provision obviously gives an 
indication of the significance attached to confidentiality in respect of 
certain information. 
The offering of securities to the public in violation of section 99 is 
an offence.158 The offence is punishable by a fine or a period of 
imprisonment not exceeding ten years.159 It will be recalled that 
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issuance of a prospectus containing misleading or false information is 
an offence in Australia.160  
Lastly, it is an offence to impede or interfere with the 
administration of the Act.161 A person convicted of this offence may, in 
terms of section 216(6), be fined or sentenced to imprisonment for up to 
12 months. 
 
3.2.3. General comments 
It is clear that the courts still have, albeit non-exclusive in most 
cases, jurisdiction over a wide array of Companies Act matters. As 
compared to Australia though, the South African courts certainly have 
limited jurisdiction. This is perhaps due, in part, to the voluminous 
nature of the Corporations Act as compared to the Companies Act 2008. 
 
3.3. The Companies Tribunal 
3.3.1. General overview 
The Companies Tribunal is a creature of section 193 of the 
Companies Act 2008. It is a legal person with jurisdiction throughout 
the country. Unlike the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, it is a novel 
innovation in the context of South African company law. The rationale 
underlying it is similar to that underpinning the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal – the speedy, efficient, easy and cheap resolution of disputes 
within its purview.162 The tribunal does not currently charge fees for its 
services163 and to this extent it certainly is a cheap dispute resolution 
forum.  
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2014’ (2014) 5 available at 
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The Act provides that the tribunal comprises ten members and a 
chairperson appointed by the Minister responsible for trade and 
industry on a fulltime or part-time basis.164 There are currently ten 
members – excluding the chairperson – nine of whom have qualifications 
in law and one is a chartered accountant.165 It is interesting that the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act prescribes neither a minimum nor 




The jurisdiction of the tribunal, as has been pointed out already, 
extends throughout South Africa. Section 195(1) mandates the tribunal 
mainly to adjudicate on matters falling within its province as well as aid 
in alternative dispute resolution as provided for in the Act. 
The tribunal’s mandate with regard to alternative dispute 
resolution has already been highlighted. Therefore, a further detailed 
consideration is not necessary here. However, it is noteworthy that the 
tribunal has not seen much activity on the alternative dispute resolution 
front in its first two years of existence. For instance, it was not called 
upon to assist in alternative dispute resolution in its first six months of 
operations167 and the picture appears to have remained the same as of 
March, 2014 despite the publication of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
                                                          
164 Companies Act ss 193(4) and 194. 
165 Companies Tribunal op cit note 163 at 10.  
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Guidelines168 but due, perhaps in part, to the non-finalisation of the 
relevant rules for the conduct of mediation, conciliation and 
arbitration.169 
The tribunal is enjoined by section 180(1) to adjudicate on matters 
brought before it with expedition and in conformity with rules of natural 
justice, without the need for formality in the proceedings. It is also 
noteworthy that section 182 confers on the tribunal such powers in 
respect of the conduct of adjudication proceedings as are conferred on 
courts in the course of trying cases. In other words the tribunal may, for 
example, summon witnesses and examine them on oath or affirmation. 
The tribunal may also make determinations as to procedural issues 
regarding matters before it. 
While it is generally guided by the High Court rules in the conduct 
of its hearings, the tribunal has published Practice Guidelines that 
‘simplify the process of filing applications with the tribunal’.170  
The tribunal also strives to make a decision on a matter within 30 
days from the date of allocating the matter or within a similar period 
from the date of hearing the matter. In the year ended March 2014, the 
tribunal is reported to have concluded 69 per cent of the 159 finalised 
cases within 30 days from the date of allocation and 80 per cent ‘of the 
decisions were issued within 30 days from date of hearing’.171 When 
compared to its performance in the first year of its operations, the 
tribunal made a marked improvement in its decision-making 
turnaround time in its second year of operations.172 
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These measures are undoubtedly intended to ensure informality 
and expedition in accordance with the requirements of sections 180 and 
182 of the Act. It is asserted that these measures make for a flexible and 
commendable adjudication process.  
For an institution that has been operational for slightly just over 
two years, the tribunal has been fairly successful in ensuring the 
speedy, cheap and efficient resolution of disputes notwithstanding the 
funding constraints it has faced during the said period.173 At the risk of 
rendering too early a verdict on its prospects for the future based on the 
past two years’ performance, the tribunal is likely to impact positively on 
South Africa in so far as its ‘competitiveness with regard to the ease of 
doing business’174 is concerned. That the tribunal is a welcome and 
progressive innovation is, therefore, not a misplaced assertion and a 
detailed consideration of its mandate is necessary. 
There are a number of provisions that specifically require that 
certain matters be brought before the tribunal for resolution by way of 
adjudication – presumably. These, in so far as they are relevant, are 
highlighted hereunder. However, it is noteworthy that in most cases an 
interested person has the option of either going to court or bringing their 
matter to the tribunal – at least in theory. 
Section 12(3), read with section 160(1), confers jurisdiction on the 
tribunal to hear and determine disputes regarding name reservation and 
registration. Name disputes appear to constitute the biggest portion of 
cases handled by the tribunal so far. For instance, in the year ending 
March, 2014, the tribunal had resolved close to 80 name disputes – the 
highest number of subject-specific disputes resolved during the said 
period.175 The tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear and determine name-related 
disputes is similar to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s power to 
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review decisions of ASIC in relation to name reservation and 
registration.176 
According to section 61(7), the tribunal has power to extend the 
time within which a public company should hold a shareholders’ annual 
general meeting. The tribunal is also mandated, in terms of section 
61(11), to make an administrative order – on the application of a 
shareholder – that a meeting of a company be convened where the 
meeting cannot be convened because the company does not have 
directors or has incapacitated directors, or the company’s memorandum 
of incorporation does not authorise a person other than directors to 
convene the meeting. In Australia, substantially similar mandates are 
bestowed on the courts and not the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
whose mandate is limited to the review mostly of some ASIC decisions in 
terms of the Corporations Act.177 
Further, where a company has less than three directors, a director 
or shareholder may apply to the tribunal for a determination regarding 
the disqualification, incompetence or incapacity of a director for 
purposes of deciding whether or not to remove the director from 
office.178 Similarly, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal may review 
ASIC’s decision to disqualify a person from managing corporations.179 In 
addition, the court in Australia may also disqualify a person from 
managing a corporation.180 
Lastly, the tribunal has power to set aside a compliance notice 




                                                          
176 Supra 52. 
177 Supra 47. 
178 Companies Act 2008 s 71(8)(b). 
179 Supra 52. 
180 Supra 47. 




The operationalisation of the National Company Law Tribunal 
(NCLT), established by section 408 of the Companies Act, 18 of 2013 (in 
this paper referred to as ‘the Companies Act 2013’)182, has been delayed 
owing to a petition in the Supreme Court challenging the eligibility 
requirements for members of the tribunal183. It should also be pointed 
out from the outset that the jurisdiction of the tribunal is far much 
wider than the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and Companies 
Tribunal.184 Therefore, the discussion of the Companies Act 2013 
dispute resolution framework focuses on the general features that 
distinguish the tribunal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and 
Companies Tribunal. It also follows that highlights of specific matters 
over which the tribunal has jurisdiction are not included in the 
discussion. 
Unlike the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and Companies 
Tribunal scenarios where appeals lie to the Federal Court of Australia185 
and a court186 respectively, appeals from decisions of the tribunal do not 
                                                          
182 Available at http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/CompaniesAct2013.pdf accessed 
on 21 February 2015. 
183 Rajat Arora ‘Government may beef up company law board as tribunal plan 
hangs fire’ Economic Times 25 December 2014 available at 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/government-may-
beef-up-company-law-board-as-tribunal-plan-hangs-
fire/articleshow/45637561.cms accessed on 11 February 2015. 
184 Perhaps to give an indication of the extent of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, some of the 
provisions of the Companies Act 2013 that empower the tribunal to hear and 
determine matters specified in them are: ss 7(7)(d) empowering the tribunal to make a 
winding-up order; 14(1) relating to approval of alteration of articles of a Public Limited 
Company; 24(1) on regulation of prospectuses; 48(2) relating to variation of 
shareholders’ rights; 55(3) on approval of issue of redeemable preference shares; 56(4) 
regarding prohibition of delivery of securities certificates; 58(3) and (4) on refusal by 
company to register a transfer or transmission of securities; 59(1) and (3) in respect of 
rectification of members’ register and suspension of voting rights respectively; 61(1) 
relating to approval of share consolidation or division; 66(1) regarding confirmation of 
share capital reduction; 97(1) authorising the  tribunal to call an annual general 
meeting; and 119 empowering the tribunal to order inspection of a company’s books.  
185 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act s 44. 
186 Section 195(7) of the Companies Act 2008 provides that an appeal from the decision 
of the Companies Tribunal regarding an order or notice of the CIPC lies to a court. The 
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lie to a court with appellate jurisdiction. An appeal from the decision of 
the tribunal lies to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal 
established by section 410 of the Act. An appeal from the appellate 
tribunal lies to the Supreme Court.187 In this regard the Indian and 
Australian models provide for a faster route to the conclusion of matters 
with finality as opposed to the South African paradigm where the appeal 
process may result in delays in bringing matters to an end with finality. 
It is worth noting that a number – specified by the Central 
Government – of benches of the tribunal shall be constituted.188 It has 
been reported that the tribunal will ‘have 63 members and 21 
benches’189. The size of the country perhaps justifies such a set up. 
However, it is suggested that South Africa should consider adopting a 
similar approach with time because it is likely to become expensive for 
people and companies to pursue their matters in Pretoria irrespective of 
which part of the country they reside in or carry on business whenever 
their physical presence or attendance before the Companies Tribunal is 
required or necessary. Alternatively, the Companies Tribunal could sit 
as a circuit tribunal to ensure that the philosophy of a cheap dispute 
resolution mechanism remains relevant.  
Further, it is also noteworthy that the members of the tribunal 
and the appellate tribunal will enjoy security of tenure much like judges 
in many commonwealth countries do.190 This is not the case with the 
Companies Tribunal whose members can only hold office for a 
maximum of two five-year terms191 and the Administrative Appeals 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Act does not specify which court has appellate jurisdiction in this respect or in respect 
of any other decision of the Companies Tribunal. However, it is suggested that where a 
decision of the Companies Tribunal is filed in the High Court as an order of that court, 
an appeal from such an order lies to the Supreme Court of Appeal. In all other cases, 
an appeal should properly lie to the High Court. 
187 Companies Act 2013 s 423. 
188 Ibid s 419. 
189 R Arora op cit note 183. 
190 Companies Act 2013 s 413(2) and (4). 
191 Companies Act 2008 s 194(7). 
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Tribunal on which a member serves for a renewable term of seven 
years192.   
Moreover, it is interesting to note that section 430 expressly 
provides that courts have no jurisdiction to hear and determine matters 
in respect of which the tribunal or appellate tribunal have jurisdiction in 
terms of the Act. This differs somewhat from the Companies Act 2008 
approach in terms of section 156, which leaves it to an interested person 
to decide which dispute resolution forum to take a matter to in most 
cases. However, the Indian model is in a sense similar to the Australian 
paradigm in so far as the jurisdiction to review certain decisions of the 
ASIC is the exclusive preserve of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 
Finally, according to section 435, offences under the Act are tried 
by courts and the Central Government is empowered to set up fast-track 
courts to try such offences. This is unlike the South African and 
Australian models where offences in terms of their respective legislation 
regulating companies are tried by the courts that have criminal 
jurisdiction in other offences. 
 
5.0. Conclusion 
There appears to be a paradigm shift in company law dispute 
resolution, ostensibly in reaction to the need for certain disputes to be 
resolved speedily and in a cost effective manner. No longer are some 
countries content with resolving all company law disputes through the 
courts.  
As to the matters to subject to tribunals and those to be left to the 
courts, there appear to be variations – with Australia restricting the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal to reviewing select decisions of the 
ASIC and other public officers in terms of the Corporations Act; South 
Africa clothing the Companies Tribunal with jurisdiction to adjudicate 
                                                          
192 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act s 8(3). 
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on matters not purely administrative; and India’s National Company 
Law Tribunal basically having jurisdiction over almost all civil matters 
that are traditionally in the realm of the courts in many commonwealth 
jurisdictions.  
It is clear from the discourse in this chapter that the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the Companies Tribunal and National 
Company Law Tribunal offer welcome relief for the often overburdened 
courts in so far as resolution of disputes is concerned. In the case of the 
Companies Tribunal, it has arguably enhanced South Africa’s 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the ease of doing business owing to its charge-
free and often timely delivery of decisions. It is yet to be seen what kind 
of impact on company law dispute resolution the National Company Law 
Tribunal will have considering that it is not yet operational. There is a 
possibility, if efficient case management systems are not employed, of its 
getting clogged up in much the same way that courts often do because 
of its extensive jurisdiction. 
The questions then are whether Zambia should establish a 
tribunal for the resolution of Companies Act disputes and, if so, what 
model should be adopted. The next chapter, apart from providing a 














CHAPTER FOUR – REFORMING THE COMPANIES ACT 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK: A 
COMPANIES TRIBUNAL FOR ZAMBIA 
 
1. Introduction 
Law reform is an indispensable imperative in any functioning legal 
system. There seems to be wide acceptance globally that law can be 
employed in the promotion of commerce and economic growth and 
development. This philosophy seems to have taken hold in Zambia as 
several business sector reforms have taken place since the early 1990s. 
The major theme of these reforms has been making the business 
regulatory environment investor friendly. The cost of doing business in 
general and the cost of dispute resolution in particular, have been 
among the focus areas of these reforms. On the dispute resolution front, 
the commercial list of the High Court was set up in order to expedite the 
disposal of commercial matters.193 
This chapter proposes further reform in the area of commercial 
dispute resolution in the context of the Companies Act. It recommends 
the establishment of a Companies Tribunal in a bid to make Zambia 
more competitive with regard to the ease of doing business. Thus, a 
summary of key conclusions drawn from the preceding chapters 
precedes the arguments around establishment of a tribunal and 
proposals regarding the nature of tribunal suitable for Zambia. 
 
2. Summary of findings 
The High Court of Zambia is the primary dispute resolution forum 
for Companies Act matters, particularly civil matters as most offences 
under Zambian laws are tried in the subordinate courts. The court 
                                                          
193 High Court (Amendment) Rules 1999 op cit 11 (note35). 
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process can be long, complex and expensive. Alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms are left to the periphery in terms of the Act. For 
example, arbitration – while possible by order of the High Court – is 
mostly resorted to where a prior agreement requires the parties to 
subject disputes arising from a contract to arbitration; and mediation is 
court-annexed in the sense that it is initiated by the High Court.  
An examination of relevant provisions of the Companies Act has 
found problematic, the blanket provision that decisions of the registrar 
in the performance or purported performance of the registrar’s functions 
under the Act are only appealable to the High Court given the 
administrative nature of some of these decisions. In addition, the 
registrar is practically as good as the final voice in respect of many of 
the decisions the registrar is empowered by the Act considering that 
seeking recourse from the High Court when one is dissatisfied with a 
decision of the registrar may not be economically prudent. A need to 
relook at the issue of recourse against the registrar’s decisions to ensure 
a responsive Companies Act dispute resolution framework has been 
identified.  
Apart from having appellate jurisdiction over the registrar’s 
decisions, the High Court has original jurisdiction over all other 
Companies Act civil matters, including the power to order rectification of 
registers of members and debenture holders; convene debenture holders’ 
and members’ meetings; and inspection of companies’ records or books. 
It has been argued that some of the matters over which the High Court 
has original jurisdiction can properly be within the province of an 
appropriate administrative regulatory body.  
Moreover, the proliferation of offences in the Companies Act has 
been identified as another aspect of the Act’s dispute resolution 
framework that needs reform. It has been observed that some of the 
breaches of the Act for which criminal sanctions are imposed can be 
dealt with administratively. The argument advanced in support of non-
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criminal sanctions, particularly for offences punishable only by fine, is 
that the status quo may arguably have a chilling effect on enterprise 
growth and development – let alone the ease of doing business. 
In order to inform the nature of reform, a comparative study of 
current trends in company law dispute resolution has been undertaken. 
The countries studied are Australia, South Africa and India. The 
notorious fact that these countries are bigger than Zambia 
geographically, demographically and economically is acknowledged. 
However, the justification for their study has been indicated mainly as 
the common law heritage shared among them as well as, in the case of 
South Africa, its geographical proximity to Zambia.  
It has been established that not all Corporations Act matters are 
amenable to the courts’ original jurisdiction. For example, specified 
administrative decisions of ASIC are amenable to review by the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal. These include ASIC’s refusal to reserve 
a proposed company name; disqualification of persons from managing 
corporations; and registration of, or refusal to register, a liquidator.  
The Corporations Act’s blanket provision that a contravention of 
the Act is an offence unless stated otherwise has been criticised as not 
being in line with the spirit of emphasising non-criminal sanctions in 
company law dispute resolution.194 
The South African model of company law dispute resolution 
affords four avenues of redress depending on the nature of the matter to 
be considered. Notwithstanding the noted inherent risk of uncertainty in 
the law in so far as the potential for conflicting decisions on materially 
similar cases by the different dispute resolution fora, the South African 
paradigm of company law dispute resolution has been lauded as being 
innovative and progressive. 
                                                          
194 The South African company law reform process noted that the use of criminal 
sanctions for breaches that could be redressed by administrative means was not 
appropriate. See Department of Trade and Industry op cit note 22 at 12. 
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That said, it has been noted that the courts in South Africa still 
have, albeit non-exclusive in most cases, jurisdiction over a wide array 
of matters in terms of the Companies Act 2008. As compared to 
Australia though, the South African courts have been found to have 
limited jurisdiction. It has also been established that there are very few 
offences in the Companies Act 2008 as compared to the Corporations 
Act. The matters over which South African courts have jurisdiction 
include convening a shareholders’ meeting; disqualifying a person from 
being a director of a company; and to order the winding-up of a 
company. 
The Companies Tribunal, it has been noted, is both an alternative 
dispute resolution and adjudication body even though the indication is 
that the tribunal is yet to be approached for alternative dispute 
resolution. The tribunal has jurisdiction in respect of such matters as 
company name disputes; extension of time for filing annual returns; and 
convening a shareholders’ meeting. Like the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal, it has been found that the Companies Tribunal has so far 
performed fairly well in so far as timeous delivery of decisions is 
concerned. 
India, it has been discovered, represents a radical departure from 
the predominantly court-based company law dispute resolution models 
in many common law countries. Not only does the Companies Act 2013 
clothe the National Company Law Tribunal with jurisdiction over a wide 
array of matters, it provides that an appeal from a decision of the 
tribunal lies to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. It has 
also been discovered that the Indian model grants to members of the two 
tribunals such tenure as is applicable to judges. 
The study of the Indian company law dispute resolution model 
has also revealed that offences in terms of the Companies Act 2013 are 
tried by courts and the central government may set up fast-track courts 
to try the offences. 
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A clear indication has emerged that the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal, the Companies Tribunal and National Company Law Tribunal 
offer welcome relief for the often overburdened courts in so far as 
resolution of disputes is concerned. In the case of the Companies 
Tribunal, the feeling is that it has arguably enhanced South Africa’s 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the ease of doing business owing to its charge-
free services and often timeous delivery of decisions. It is yet to be seen 
what kind of impact on company law dispute resolution the National 
Company Law Tribunal will have considering that it is not yet 
operational. 
 
3. In support of a Companies Tribunal for Zambia 
The starting point is a general reiteration of the arguments 
advanced in the first chapter on the advantages associated with 
tribunals.195 On the specific advantage of affording a cheaper alternative 
to court litigation, the paper has indicated that lowering the cost of 
dispute resolution is one of the factors considered as enhancing the ease 
of doing business.196 A Companies Tribunal that assures low cost 
dispute resolution, like the South African Companies Tribunal, would 
most likely influence Zambia’s ranking with regard to ease of doing 
business positively especially against the backdrop of an expensive 
commercial court process.197 
Secondly, the flexibility and informality associated with tribunal 
proceedings assist in ensuring speedy disposal of matters – an attribute 
widely accepted as preferred by the business community.  
Thirdly, if the qualifications for appointment as member of the 
South African Companies Tribunal are anything to go by, a Companies 
Tribunal for Zambia presents an opportunity for the appointment of 
                                                          
195 Supra 3. 
196 Supra 12. 
197 Ibid note 36. 
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members who have expertise in company law as well as commerce 
generally. This is generally in contrast with the current situation where 
a judge of the High Court can be allocated a matter in any branch of law 
irrespective of the judge’s area of expertise. 
Further, the registrar currently wields too much unchecked power 
in terms of the Companies Act. This presents the risk of lack of 
accountability and may result in arbitrary decisions being made on the 
understanding that it is unlikely that an aggrieved person would go to 
court to challenge such decisions in most cases. Therefore, making the 
registrar’s decisions amenable to the jurisdiction of the proposed 
tribunal would go a long way in assuring accountability and availing a 
platform to people to challenge decisions they may be aggrieved with in 
a friendly, flexible, cheap and informal setting.  
Fifthly, the need to provide for non-criminal sanctions in respect 
of some of the offences created by the Companies Act would result in an 
overburdening of the courts if not implemented. This would likely have 
the effect of making litigation more costly and time consuming. 
Conversion of some of the offences to civil wrongs in respect of which 
the proposed tribunal would have jurisdiction would certainly make the 
courts’ burden lighter. 
Sixthly, as the comparative study in the preceding chapter has 
shown, there seems to be recognition internationally that the courts may 
not be adequately responsive to the need for speedy, informal, flexible 
and cheap resolution of disputes. It is asserted that Zambia’s 
establishment of a Companies Tribunal would be in tune with growing 
international best practice in the area of company law dispute 
resolution.  
Seventhly, as the African continent pursues regional integration, 
harmonisation of business laws to boost intra-regional trade is ever 
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becoming more imperative.198 It is posited that, with South Africa 
leading the way in setting up a Companies Tribunal for the resolution of 
some company law disputes and Zambia – to the extent possible and 
appropriate for the jurisdiction – following suit, some more ground 
would have been laid for the harmonisation of countries’ company law 
dispute resolution frameworks owing to similarities in approach. The 
idea might seem remote presently but could prove useful in informing 
the harmonisation agenda vis-à-vis dispute resolution in regional 
company law.  
Lastly, tribunals are not a strange phenomenon in Zambia. A 
number of statutes dealing with certain specialised areas of the law 
provide for tribunals.199 The operations of the existing tribunals have 
not been without challenges.200 However, these challenges should not be 
seen as an indication that tribunals have no place in Zambia. Rather, 
the challenges should be examined and measures proposed to ensure 
that the proposed Companies Tribunal is not beset by similar challenges 
if avoidable. In any case, it has been stated that the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal and the South African Companies Tribunal, though 




                                                          
198 For more on the developments in Africa regarding harmonisation of business laws, 
see Salvatore Mancuso ‘Trends on the Harmonization of Contract Law in Africa’ (2007) 
13 Annual Survey of Internal and Comparative Law 157 – 78 available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1115&context=annlsurv
ey accessed on 11 February 2015. 
199 Examples include the Revenue Appeals tribunal Act 11 of 1998 available at 
http://www.zambialii.org/files/zm/legislation/act/1998/11/rata1998256.pdf 
accessed on 11 February 2015; and the Lands Tribunal Act 39 of 2010 available at 
http://www.zambialii.org/files/zm/legislation/act/2010/39/The%20lands%20tribal%2
0Act%2C%202010.%201.PDF accessed on 11 February 2015.  
200 See for example Kelvin Mpembamoto An Evaluation of the Revenue Appeals Tribunal 
(unpublished LLB Obligatory Essay, University of Zambia, 2009) 20 – 33 available at 
http://dspace.unza.zm:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/2419/MPEMBAMOT
O0001.PDF?sequence=1 accessed on 11 February 2015. 
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4. A Companies Tribunal for Zambia: some recommendations 
It is not in doubt that a Companies Tribunal is necessary for 
Zambia. The question that remains is: what kind of tribunal should it 
be? In answering this question, recommendations regarding its 
membership and jurisdiction are given hereunder. These 
recommendations obviously draw from the Companies Act dispute 
resolution framework against the backdrop of the comparative 
perspective presented in chapter three. 
In so far as membership or composition of the respective tribunals 
considered in this paper is concerned, only India makes provision for 
tenure similar to the tenure enjoyed by judges generally. South Africa 
and Australia provide for fixed terms. The practice with regard to tenure 
of tribunal members in Zambia is similar to the Australian and South 
African approach.201 Therefore, the members of the proposed tribunal 
should serve for fixed terms as has been the practice with other 
tribunals.  
In Australia, a prominent qualification for appointment as a 
member of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal is enrolment as a legal 
practitioner. In the case of South Africa, qualifications in law and 
commerce related fields suffice. In India – and perhaps that is why there 
is a petition pending in the Supreme Court regarding membership 
eligibility requirements – the qualifications include eligibility for 
appointment as a judge. The South African eligibility criteria are 
recommended for Zambia because of their representativeness in terms of 
relevant expertise in the field not only of law but commerce as well. 
It is also recommended that members be appointed on a part-time 
basis for a start because retaining fulltime members may be very costly 
to the government. The legislation to establish the proposed tribunal 
should empower the Minister responsible for trade and industry to 
                                                          
201 See Lands Tribunal Act 2010 s 6(1); and Revenue Appeals Tribunal Act 1998 s 4(3). 
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appoint members on fulltime or part-time basis so that, with time, there 
is flexibility in the nature of appointment depending on cost 
sustainability and demand for the proposed tribunal’s services. The 
South African approach is informative in this regard. 
On territorial jurisdiction, it is suggested that the proposed 
tribunal have jurisdiction throughout Zambia just like the South African 
Companies Tribunal. As is the case with Lands Tribunal,202 the 
proposed tribunal should be authorised to have circuit sittings in order 
to enhance access by those who may not be in the immediate vicinity of 
the ordinary seat of the tribunal. In India the approach is to set up 
benches of the National Company Law Tribunal in various places. While 
this approach suits India because of its large population and 
geographical area, it may be costly for Zambia to maintain permanent 
structures in the various provinces or districts. 
Caution is urged in determining the nature of tribunal suitable for 
Zambia so that there is no wholesome transplantation of a particular 
jurisdiction’s approach. A hybrid tribunal suitable to Zambia is 
recommended. In this regard, it is proposed that decisions of the 
registrar relating to incorporation and conversion of companies, 
company accounts, audit, annual returns, and foreign companies 
should no longer be appealable to the High Court. They should be 
amenable to the exclusive jurisdiction of the proposed tribunal in order 
to render the remedies envisaged in the right to challenge such 
decisions relevant and practicable. In other words the proposed tribunal 
should, somewhat like the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, be clothed 
with authority to review decisions of the registrar falling in the 
categories specified above. 
In addition to the power to review most of the decisions of the 
registrar, it is recommended that the proposed tribunal be empowered to 
                                                          
202 Lands Tribunal Act 2010 s 10(4). 
80 
 
determine matters – currently vested in the High Court – relating to the 
incorporation, membership (except in respect of rectification of members 
or debenture holders registers where the issue hinges on entitlement to 
be entered in or removed from the register), management and 
administration of companies. This is because most of these are of such 
an administrative nature as to be best resolved by an administrative 
tribunal as opposed to the courts. 
It is also recommended that Companies Act offences punishable 
by a fine should be made civil wrongs over which the proposed tribunal 
should have jurisdiction and be empowered to impose administrative 
fines. Conferring power on the proposed tribunal to impose 
administrative fines would be a departure from the South African 
approach where only the courts can impose such fines. In the Zambian 
context, it would not be a novel development for a statutory body to have 
power to impose administrative fines.203 It is noteworthy that a close 
look at most of these minor offences reveals that they are infractions 
that need not be criminal in nature and thus suited to resolution by an 
administrative tribunal. 
The status quo should be maintained in respect of the High 
Court’s jurisdiction over securities, fundamental transactions and 
winding-up. In addition, the more serious offences – those punishable 
by fine or imprisonment – should be maintained as such and remain 
within the province of the courts. This is obviously because a largely 
administrative tribunal is not the appropriate forum for dealing with 
such complex matters and offences. 
The South African innovation, though yet to be tested, of 
mandating the Companies Tribunal to be an alternative dispute 
                                                          
203 Sections 73 and 74 of the Civil Aviation Authority Act 7 of 2012 empowers the Civil 
Aviation Authority to impose administrative fines in respect of certain contraventions 
of the Act. The Act is available at 
http://www.parliament.gov.zm/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=1
041 accessed on 11 February 2015. 
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resolution forum is recommended for Zambia in light of the peripheral 
role alternative dispute resolution appears to be playing under the 
current company law dispute resolution model. 
It is expected that these recommended reforms to the Zambian 
company law dispute resolution framework will contribute to enhancing 
the country’s competitiveness with regard to the ease of doing business. 
These proposed reforms could not have come at a better time than now 
when the Companies Act is undergoing review. It is hoped that the 
proposals will be taken on board and eventually be incorporated in the 
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